PAUL ZILUNGISELE TEMBE

The latest developments in the global arena suggest that understanding China and its style of governance is helpful in mapping a possible direction in the looming new world order. In addition, understanding the potential path of China’s policy will assist in better planning possible future moves to leverage with China. The most recent decision by BRICS to establish their own reserve currency is but one example stemming from developments in establishing better South-South cooperation, with China at the helm. South Africa should capitalise on the developments cited in my book Xi Jinping Thought – Through South African Eyes, leveraging its status as a comprehensive strategic partner to China sharing multiple multilateral platforms, including economic growth and world peace.

Maendeleo ya hivi karibuni katika majukwaa ya kimataifa yanadhihirisha kwamba kuielewa China na mfumo wake wa utawala kutasaidia kuweka uelekeo sahihi kuelekea kuupata Utaratibu Mpya wa Dunia. Kwa kuongezea, kuuelewa mwelekeo wa sera za China kutasaidia kuiweka mipango vyema ili kunufaika na fursa ilizonazo China. Uamuzi wa hivi karibuni uliofanywa na BRICS kuanzisha sarafu ya akiba ya fedha za kigeni ni miongoni tu mwa mifano mizuri ya kuendeleza ushirikiano wa mataifa ya kusini mwa dunia, China ikiwa kinara. Afrika Kusini inatakiwa kuitumia vyema mifano iliyoainishwa katika kitabu hiki kwa kuhakikisha inakuwa mbia muhimu wa China kwa kujenga uhusiano katika maeneo tofauti ya kisekta ikiwamo maendeleo ya kiuchumi na kuimarisha amani duniani.

There is much to admire and learn from the unparalleled potency of China’s anti-corruption campaign, unequalled by any country in numbers and speed. Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, 1.5 million government bureaucrats have been punished, and more than 900,000 members of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have been expelled. What informs this effective anti-graft campaign led by the CPC’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)?

Kuna mengi ya kustaajabisha na kujifunza kutokana na nguvu isiyo na kifani ya kampeni ya China ya kupambana na ufisadi. Ni kasi isiyo na kifani inapolinganishwa na yoyote. Tangu Rais Xi Jinping aingie madarakani mwaka 2012, warasimu milioni 1.5 wa serikali wameadhibiwa, na zaidi ya wanachama 900,000 wa Chama cha Kikomunisti cha China (CPC) wamefukuzwa. Ni nini kinachoifahamisha kampeni hii bora ya kupinga ufisadi inayoongozwa na Tume Kuu ya Ukaguzi wa Nidhamu ya CPC (CCDI)?

On 18 January this year, President Xi was unequivocal in maintaining his executive political resolve to ‘take out tigers’, ‘swat flies’, and ‘hunt down foxes’ found to be involved in acts of malfeasance and corruption. His resolve stems from a simple realisation, stated in 2014 to justify that campaign:

‘People hate corruption the most, so we must be determined to fight against corruption to win support from the people.’

The inference here is obvious. Failure to fight corruption has the effect of delegitimising the people’s support for those entrusted, in the public and private sectors, with protecting public resources. Success in dealing decisively with the corrupt contributes to generating public confidence in elected leaders.

Tarehe 18 Januari mwaka huu, Rais Xi hakuwa na shaka katika kudumisha azimio lake kuu la kisiasa la ‘kuwaondoa simbamarara’, ‘nzi wadudu’, na ‘kuwawinda mbweha’ waliokutwa na hatia ya kuhusika katika vitendo vya kuvunja sheria na ufisadi. Azimio lake linatokana na utambuzi rahisi, ulioelezwa mwaka 2014 kuhalalisha kampeni hiyo:

‘Watu wanachukia ufisadi zaidi, kwa hivyo ni lazima tuazimie kupambana na ufisadi ili kuungwa mkono na wananchi.’

Mtazamo hapa ni dhahiri. Kushindwa kupambana na rushwa kunasababisha kutoungwa mkono na wananchi kwa wale waliokabidhiwa, katika sekta ya umma na binafsi, kulinda rasilimali za umma. Mafanikio katika kushughulikia mafisadi huchangia kujenga imani ya umma kwa viongozi waliochaguliwa.

In meeting appropriate punishment to the corrupt, the CPC has not been shy in varying sentences from harsh to harshest, driving home the message to achieve ‘the strategic goal of not daring to, not being able to, and not wanting to be corrupt’. That uncompromising stance is underlined in China because corruption robs institutions of resources that could be used to deliver common goods.

Corruption can be likened to a malign pandemic present around the globe that stifles economic growth, exacerbates inequality, and hampers the pursuit of social justice.

Katika kutoa adhabu stahiki kwa mafisadi, CPC haikuona haya kutoa adhabu kali, ikipeleka ujumbe ili kufikia ‘lengo la kimkakati la kutothubutu, kutoweza, na kutotaka kufanya ufisadi’. Msimamo huo usiobadilika unasisitizwa nchini China kwa sababu ufisadi huzinyang’anya taasisi rasilimali ambazo zingeweza kutumika kusambaza bidhaa za kawaida.

Ufisadi unaweza kulinganishwa na janga lililopo duniani kote ambalo linazuia uchumi kukua, kuzidisha uonevu, na kukandamiza haki ya kijamii.

That explains why China was the first country to sign and formalise the Charter of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), a game-changer in promoting international cooperation on, for example, asset recovery from implicated individuals and families mentioned in the Zondo Inquiry into State Capture. While China prioritises actions first and rhetoric second in its anti-graft campaign, there is existential urgency for the law enforcement authorities in South Africa to similarly act and deliver on prosecuting and imprisoning those proven to be corrupt. The very survival of the democratic project hinges on this to avoid the country descending into total anarchy, lawlessness, and failed state status.

Hii inaeleza kwa nini China ilikuwa nchi ya kwanza kutia saini na kurasimisha Mkataba wa Umoja wa Mataifa wa Kupambana na Rushwa (UNCAC), ambao, kwa mfano, hurejesha mali kutoka kwa watu binafsi na familia zilizotajwa katika Tume ya Uchunguzi ya Zondo inayochunguza mali za umma zilizoporwa. Wakati China inatanguliza kwanza vitendo halafu maneno baadaye katika kampeni yake ya kupinga ufisadi, kuna udharura wa kuwapo kwa mamlaka za kutekeleza sheria nchini Afrika Kusini vivyo hivyo kuchukua hatua katika kuwashtaki na kuwafunga jela wale waliothibitishwa kuwa wafisadi. Kudumu kwa kidemokrasia kunategemea hili ili kuepusha nchi kutumbukia katika machafuko kamili, uvunjaji wa sheria, na hadhi ya serikali iliyoshindwa.

President Xi has made fighting corruption his legacy focus, which is why the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has been adequately resourced with a zero-tolerance attitude. In fact, the anti-corruption campaign was the first thing to be emphasised – and continuously so – during the reform and opening-up period. As Secretary of the CCDI Zhao Leji says, this was achieved through a ‘centralised, unified, authoritative, and efficient oversight system with complete coverage’. In the process, they have ‘combined law-based punishment, institutional checks, and education to make [their] anti-corruption governance more effective’.

Rais Xi amefanya kupambana na rushwa kuwa kipaumbele chake, na ndiyo maana CCDI imepewa rasilimali za kutosha na kutakiwa kutovumilia matendo ya ufisadi. Kwa hakika, kampeni ya kupambana na ufisadi ilikuwa jambo la kwanza kusisitizwa–na kuendelea na msisitizo huo. Kama Katibu wa CCDI Zhao Leji anavyosema, hili lilifikiwa kupitia ‘mfumo wa usimamizi uliowekwa chini ya makao makuu ya nchi, uliounganishwa, wenye mamlaka na ufanisi katika kushughulikia ufisadi kikamilifu’. Katika mchakato huo, ‘wameunganisha adhabu inayozingatia sheria, ukaguzi wa kitaasisi, na elimu ili kufanya mamlaka [yao] ya kupambana na ufisadi yawe na ufanisi zaidi’.

That comprehensive anti-graft project includes private sectors such as property and technology, which have failed to emphasise prudent fiscal policies, actions, and behaviour. It is to be remembered that China’s financial system is estimated to be worth $54 trillion. Hence, since October 2021, about 24 officials and regulators have faced the full might of Chinese law. Again, this uncompromising zero tolerance is based on the logic that corruption robs people of their bottom-line livelihoods.

Mradi huo wa kina dhidi ya ufisadi unajumuisha sekta za kibinafsi kama vile mali na teknolojia, ambazo zimeshindwa kusisitiza sera za fedha, vitendo na tabia za aina hiyo. Ikumbukwe kwamba mfumo wa kifedha wa China unakadiriwa kuwa na thamani ya $54 trilioni. Kwa hivyo, tangu Oktoba 2021, maafisa na wadhibiti wapatao 24 wamekabiliwa na nguvu kamili ya sheria ya China. Tena, uvumilivu huu usiobadilika unatokana na mantiki kwamba rushwa inawanyima watu wengi riziki zao.

For China’s progress and development to be maintained and for the efficient implementation of its 14th Five-Year Plan, corruption is dealt with immediately and harshly so that public and private officials ‘don’t dare to, are unable to, and have no desire to commit acts of corruption’. Lessons for South Africa are patent:

Ili ustawi na maendeleo ya China yadumishwe na kutekeleza kwa ufanisi Mpango wake wa 14 wa Miaka Mitano, rushwa inashughulikiwa mara moja na kwa ukali ili viongozi wa umma na binafsi ‘wasithubutu, wasiweze na wasiwe na nia ya kufanya hivyo vitendo vya rushwa’. Masomo kwa Afrika Kusini ni hataza:

Executive leadership should be seen to punish the corrupt decisively without fear or favour so that the investments made into the Zondo Commission will have meaningful returns.

Uongozi wa kiutendaji uonekane unawaadhibu mafisadi bila woga wala upendeleo ili uwekezaji unaofanywa kwenye Tume ya Zondo uwe na faida ya maana.

State institutions in charge of law enforcement should be adequately resourced, as with the defunct Scorpions.

Taasisi za serikali zinazosimamia utekelezaji wa sheria zinapaswa kuwa na rasilimali za kutosha, kama ilivyo kwa kitengo cha Scorpions kilichokufa.

Public patience for acts of corruption is not unlimited. There is a direct link between state legitimacy and intolerance for graft, especially if we are to dissuade people from partaking in kangaroo justice.

Uvumilivu wa umma kwa vitendo vya rushwa hauna kikomo. Kuna uhusiano wa moja kwa moja kati ya uhalali wa serikali na kutovumilia ufisadi, hususan ikiwa tunataka kuwazuia watu kushiriki katika haki ya kangaroo.

Political parties should not be shy of immediately expelling those found by courts to be guilty of corruption.

Vyama vya siasa havipaswi kuona haya kuwafukuza mara moja wale ambao mahakama inawakuta na hatia ya ufisadi.

It bears repeating that since President Xi came to power in 2012, the Communist Party of China has expelled more than 900,000 members from the Party, irrespective of their position and history.

Inasemekana kwamba tangu Rais Xi aingie madarakani mwaka 2012, CPC imewafukuza wanachama zaidi ya 900,000 kutoka kwa Chama, bila kujali nafasi zao na historia.