PATRIC TARIQ MELLET

between what I see and what I say
between what I say and what I keep silent
between what I keep silent and what I dream
between what I dream and what I forget
poetry
it slips between yes and no
Octavio Paz

In all the writings about Autshumao and his niece Krotoa there is both deft and crippling surgery of the truth, lobbing off important moments of his life, and there is blatant inaccuracy and misrepresentation. Like the Mexican poet Octavio Paz’s ^{[1]Paz O; In Tapscott S; Twentieth-century Latin American Poetry – a bilingual anthology; Entre lo que veo y digo pg 262; Univ Texas Press; Austin (1996).} description of where poetry resides, so is it the case when it comes to the history of the leading Khoi  personality of his times and early founder of the proto port of Cape Town; indeed likewise with the history of the Khoi people as a whole.

Autshumao’s story well illustrates that the power of the individual in history at times is as powerful as that of the social group, sometimes more so, and that the trajectory of history is a dialectical relationship between these two forces. The individual too, though often politicised over time, most likely does not carry out an overtly or intended political or even social struggle. As far as what consciousness Autshumao and his niece Krotoa may have had about the bigger ramifications of their actions, with the absence of more record in their own voice, we simply don’t know. But from the little we do have we know that they did have a fair degree of consciousness for their times.

The individual, in this case Autshumao, however can carry the weight of a sudden transformative geo-political and economic moment in time and thus inadvertently he became a political statement of his time. What this story shows is that the true account presents an inconvenient truth for a colonial narrative that has dominated how both pre-colonial history and colonial history is framed. Perhaps the nearest that we will ever get to seeing a measure of Autshumao’s political-social consciousness in words, are the protest statements captured by the Commander’s scribe in his journal; particularly the statement regarding the injustice done to them, at the time when Jan van Riebeeck announced to them that they had lost their land to the sword.

As the stated most senior leader present at that meeting, the elderly Autshumao certainly understood the gravity of the moment and the Commander notes just how articulate, bold and feisty Autshumao was at that meeting.

In coming to get a perspective on Autshumao it is important to always keep in mind those writing about him and how their thinking was framed, their motivations and the social space which Nigel Penn^{[2]Penn N; The forgotten Frontier – Colonist & Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern Frontier in the 18th Century; pg 4; Ohio University Press; Athens (2005).} highlights as that of the pdramatis personae. We should hear Penn’s caution for us to take cognisance of these factors when viewing historical ‘evidence’. He particularly shows us how the Khoi voice is suppressed and distorted because of the way the circumstance is viewed through a particular lens. The European imperialist and legal shaping lens has resulted in othering and dumbing-down the few Khoi voices that we have had the privilege to hear over the passing sands of time. The colonial record too, itself provides a degree of clarity, if viewed through a different lens. It is so blatant when reading the primary research texts against some of the key secondary writings, such as that of the American Richard Elphick, that much license has been taken in subjectively projecting a narrative that buys into the ‘primitivisation’ and ‘rascalisation’ of Autshumao and an unquestioning acceptance or identification with the assumed civilised ground in a struggle as recorded by Jan van Riebeeck and his scribe. Key pieces of information in the primary texts are left out of the story and in some areas there is a conjuring up of a storyline to create a coherent and favoured colonial narrative. The huge contradiction throughout the Autshumao story between two radically contrasting images of the man is lost on most researchers when on the one hand van Riebeeck projects Autshumao as a primitive, rascal beach bum and scavenger and on the other hand says of him:

“Besides we have been cruelly deceived in our interpreter Herri, whom we had always maintained as the chief of the lot, who had always dined at our table as a friend of the house and been dressed in Dutch clothes; besides also that from every fresh arrival he was provided with bags of bread, rice, wine, &c., by way of remunerating him for his services as interpreter.”^{[3]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part II; pp}

The description of an entrepreneurial Khoi man who dressed in European clothes and who engaged in multicultural practices leading a community of traders of mixed ancestry appears not once but throughout European writings over thirty years. Instead of this real man, the image presented by painter Charles Bell over 200 years later, when he imagined the first meeting between the Dutch led by Van Riebeeck and the Khoi led by Autshumao, is deeply embedded in the consciousness of all. The picture caricatures Autshumao as a startled ‘strandloper’ savage.
           
The story of Autshumao is in microcosm an illustration of everything that Walter Rodney ^{[4]Rodney W; How Europe Underdeveloped Africa; Howard University Press; (1974).} , the revolutionary African-in-Diaspora political-economy analyst from Guyana who was cut down in his prime by an assassin in 1980, conveyed in his book ‘How Europe underdeveloped Africa’ published in 1972. The struggle on the Table Bay shoreline at the Camissa River was fundamentally about the Europeans empowering themselves at the expense of African advancement. The under-development or usurping of the natural advancement of a strategic African port run by indigenous Africans was a key building block in Europe’s amassing power to itself in the race for global domination. The ruthless conquest of the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) traders by appropriating their strategic resources, curtailing their access to clients, controlling the value they put on their products and services, stereotyping them as too primitive to participate in the new economy while destroying their ability to maintain control of their livestock-rearing agrarian economy, and Europeans engaging in physical annihilation of indigenes as the ultimate control, are all facets of Autshumao’s story. It’s the story of how Africa, actually by force, developed Europe, to invert Rodney’s phrase.

The sudden resurrection of a 5 year old cold-case against Autshumao in 1658 and the manner in which it was presented and evaluated in a summary kangaroo-court, resulted in a devastating life sentence on Robben Island that took Autshumao from hero status to zero. Accompanying this act was the confiscation of all of his wealth and the subjugation of all Khoi on the Cape Peninsular to the will of the Dutch VOC. It illustrates the centrality to Autshumao’s story of what the British cockney slang calls a ‘stitch-up’. It is this stitch-up that creates a haze around the story of Autshumao, and provided Jan van Riebeeck with an opportunity for vicious ‘payback’ and the opportunity to achieve by means of a treaty in one day, what Autshumao had prevented for six years.

The ‘stitch-up’ deprived Autshumao of the kind of life he should have enjoyed after the entrepreneurship, fastidiousness and hard work he had exemplified. Like any successful entrepreneur he knew what it was like to start over and over again until successful and as such he provides an amazing African role-model for our youth in the 21^st century. The cold-case kangaroo-court brought an end to the co-dependent relationship that Jan van Riebeeck and Autshumao shared with each other.  While most stories about Autshumao project Autshumao as a nuisance factor for Jan van Riebeeck, for most of Jan van Riebeeck’s time at the Cape he frequently required Autshumao’s assistance as much as he feared Autshumao’s pluck and influence on others. Autshumao too was a figure in history who was an African poised between West and East, poised between a pastoral economy and trading-service economy, and, by all accounts he handled this pressured pioneering role with valour and skill. The subjugation of Autshumao as an individual was also the first step in the conquest of South Africa by Europeans.

My 9^th great grandmother, Krotoa (!goa/gõas – meaning a girl cared for by others) ^{[5]Du Plessis M Dr; Dept of General Linguistics – Stellenbosch University ; Nama language consultation (2018).} was the ward of my 11^th great grand-uncle, the remarkable man of this story, known as Autshumao (‖Au-tsâma-ao meaning a man who swims around with fish… a likely reference to his travels to Java and his frequent boat trips back and forth to Saldahna Bay, Hout Bay and Robben Island ^{[6]Van Sitters B; Khoi and San Active Awareness Group; Nama language consultation (2019).}.). These two early Khoi figures have not been treated justly by history.

Circa 1630 Autshumao travelled to Banten (Bantam) in Java ^{[7]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; Chap 4 pp 83-66; Raven Press; Johannesburg(1985)} with the English and, was able to learn some of the European languages, English in particular, as well as had exposure to the European traveller’s needs and ways of doing things. He was returned to Table Bay after this internship. One would not be wrong in interpreting this as a form of training or internship for a career in port servicing and trading and his entry into the chandler and stevedore business. It is important to put this fact up front as there has been a deliberate primitivising and dumbing-down of Autshumao by the colonial narrative which this paper will attempt to dispel.

Autshumao was regarded for some time by all European shipping stopping at the Cape to be at the service of the English as the postmaster and Governor of Robben Island according to a traveller ^{[8]Mundy P. edt Sir Richard Carnac Temple Vink M (2003). The World’s oldest trade: Dutch Slavery and slave trade in the Indian Ocean in the 17th Century. Journal of World History (1967). P 327 The travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia 1698 -1667} who recorded meeting him. From around 1638 ^{[9] Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; Chap 4 pg 84; Raven Press; Johannesburg(1985)} Autshumao assisted by his English clients moved back to the mainland Table Bay from Robben Island with his followers and went on to become the founder of the proto-port at Table Bay that over three centuries would grow into the city of Cape Town.

In 1652 all of Autshumao’s efforts were usurped when the Dutch United East India Company (VOC), authorised with powers of state by the Dutch States General, established a permanent settlement, took over the administration of port services, and the natural resources of the port. In the process of this take-over Autshumao was divested of his accomplishments, marginalised, humiliated and finally imprisoned just at the time that he had begun to recover his local stature. At the centre of this final assault on him by Jan van Riebeeck was the manipulation of a cold-case in 1653 involving the murder of a Dutch shepherd and theft of the VOC herd of cattle.  A combination of the cold-case and a hostage-taking drama initiated by Jan van Riebeeck assisted by the interpreter Doman, was used to extract a peace treaty with the Goringhaiqua and Gorachoqua that effectively surrendered to Jan van Riebeeck everything that he had sought since 1652 but was prevented from achieving by Autshumao.

The initial establishment of a fort-come-refreshment-station for ships by VOC Commander Jan van Riebeeck soon became a Dutch colony for a century and a half and then it was conquered by the British. In the passage of time the Colony grew into the country known to the world as the Republic of South Africa. 

In the crude attempts to imply that there was no conquest in 1652, Jan van Riebeeck distorted his first impressions of the local population by reducing the ‖Ammaqua traders by projecting them as non-permanent residents of Table Bay whom he labled ‘strandlopers’  or beachcombers with no permanent abode. This blurred the edges between the ǁAmmaqua ^{[10]Valentijn F; Reference Map circa 1717 Cape showing the name ‖Ammaqua (Watermans); https://digitalcollections.lib.uct.ac.za} (Watermans) and the Sonqua (Strandloopers). Later even Jan van Riebeeck had to grudgingly acknowledge that he made a huge mistake in his crude approach to evaluating Autshumao and his people and dumbing them down as ‘strandloper savages’: ^{[11]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part III; pp pp.85-86}

 “13 May 1656:  It won’t do to say they are merely wild savages, what can they do? For the more they are known, the more impertinent they are found to be, and certainly not so savage and stupid as beasts. They will seize their chance whenever it offers, whilst their daily intercourse with the Dutch makes them sharper every day.”

There are more research records available on the lives of Autshumao and his niece Krotoa, including of their voices, than any other indigenous African in South Africa for at least a century and a half from 1652. Comparative written accounts of their lives by European contemporaries starting around 1630 also show that both personalities were frequently maligned, misrepresented and portrayed in a derogatory manner by some, inconsistent with other historical records which are quite complimentary and in contradiction with the former. Between this maligning and the popular notion during the European ‘enlightenment’ period of the ‘Hottentot’ as the ‘noble savage’ – part man and part beast, we have been bequeathed an over-amplified distorted story of Autshumao and his times. This account seeks to present an alternative appraisal. It is a shame that some in the late 20^th century and in the 21^st century in respectable academic institutions and in public life, such as the former Western Cape Premier Helen Zille ^{[12]Mkhwebane B; PublicProtector Report – Zille’s colonialism tweet: The Full Public Protector’s Report; 13 June 2018}, still beat the old ill-informed drums of colonial virtue and prowess vs indigenous inferiority and ineptitude, as loudly as they did in the past.

This account also, without dwelling on it, seeks to have the reader think about skewed European historical overlays on our primary story of Autshumao, which if not considered may disadvantage the enquiring mind from understanding motivations of the Europeans for using confusing identity labelling and boxing of the various peoples that they met at the Cape. Central to the games played with identities were the then popular stories, draped in mythologies, about two very real African kingdoms to the north – the Butwa (Butna) kingdom in northwestern Zimbabwe and the Mutapa kingdom straddling northeastern Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

The Dutch at the Cape were infatuated with these kingdoms (to which van Riebeeck refers in his journal) because they were known to be the source of gold and ivory.^{[13]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.380; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} They also feared the stories about the powerful people of these kingdoms and in the forefront of their minds tried to unravel the relationships between the indigenous people whom they encountered at the Cape, and those of the two northern kingdoms. They wrongly thought that the great Monomutapa was much nearer that it actually was in fact. Autshumao would also have known about the Mutapa stories from his travels and certainly would have played this as a card to his advantage when the Dutch tried to unravel lines of authority going inland of those they believed to simply be outriders of a bigger more powerful inland kingdom. In his journal Jan van Riebeeck says: ^{[14]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part III; H.C.V. Leibrandt; pg 8; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}
“the Chobonas, whose authority over this Cape people is still superior to that of Namana, and who are very rich in gold, and where it is supposed that the river Spirito Sancto lies, from which all the gold is taken to Mozambique, and not more than 120 or 130 miles to the north-east from this place. Their chief is evidently the Monomotaper, or Emperor of this distant region……  we would be pleased by your proceeding towards the Chobona or the town Monopatapa, which is rich in gold and the dwelling place of the Emperor, The land also is rich in gold near the river Spirito Sancto. You are to find out when meeting a nation, how they live, what chief they have, what clothes, what means of earning a living ; what their religion is, heir dwellings, their fortifications are and whether they have any reasonable government”

These kingdoms existed and there were old lines of trade right down south, but at the same time these also did not exist in the manner conjured up by the Dutch officials at the Cape. The two kingdoms were nowhere near only being 130 miles from Table Bay as believed by Jan van Riebeeck. For this reason the European terms – tribe, nation and kingdom are contradictorily used by the Dutch at different times quite inappropriately. Many today jump to all sorts of emphatic conclusions, and make wild claims based on the conjured up identity narratives gleaned from colonial writings which were highly impregnated with mythology and other European creations. The story of Autshumao cannot be understood without factoring in all of these under-currents.

The Khoi of the Cape Peninsular

The Khoi people at the time of this story are a very good example of micro social groups of herder societies that had not yet transformed into tight stratified social classes or formations such as a nation, kingdom or even a tribe (see discussion by Elphick on Hoernle). ^{[15]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; Chap 3 pp 43-56; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985) / read with – Hoernle AW; The social organisation of the Namaqua Hottentots of Southwest Africa; pp 1-25; American Anthropologist; Jan – March 1925} The Khoi structures of governance also actually had more in common with modern day democracies at a time when Europeans were still very much in classical European feudal mode.  The Europeans just could not get their heads around the flat governance and consultative (public participation) approaches of Khoi society. When the Bi’a (Head) or Kai Bi’a (Great Head) was told to order a member of his or her society to sell a bull to the VOC, the Dutch could not understand the response that the Bi’a had no power to order a person to do such an act.

The Khoi existed in the space of flexibility associated with clan and extended family behaviour. It was a natural manifestation of the kind of economic activity which was their mainstay – namely livestock farming, where the herding-ranching operated within a large spread of territory which they traversed along regular transhumance routes. Leadership within this context was multiple, non-hierarchical, less hereditary and based on strength and recognition of leadership qualities. ^{[16]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; Chap 3 pp 43-56; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985) / read with – Harinck G; Interaction  between  Xhosa and Khoi; African Societies in Southern Africa; edt Thompson L; Heinemann (1967) / read with – Kolbe P; The present state of the Cape of Good Hope; Trs Guido Medley; Innys W ; London (1731).} Because everyone was spread out over great distances, consultation was the name of the game when coming together to make decisions. There was no ambiguity about land ownership or territorial dominion as is often suggested by colonial historians. There simply was a different paradigm of thinking that put less emphasis on construction of permanent abodes and more emphasis on use of grazing land, herding routes, water access and seasonal habitation stations. In what became the Cape District and Stellenbosch District of the early colony there were basically four transhumance routes demarcated as being used by four different loosely organised Cape Khoi social groups, and one permanent trading station settlement. ^{[17]Mountain A; The First People of the Cape; pp 42 – 46; David Philip; Cape Town (2003).}

Two of the social groups, the Gorachoqua and the Goringhaiqua moved their herds near to each other between the western Diep River and eastern Berg River in an anti-clockwise transhumance route from around a furthest point about ten kilometres short of today’s Malmesbury and near to today’s Wellington where they spent their winters. In the long summers these two groups came into the Peninsula with the Goringhaiqua having their settlements along the slopes of what is today’s Southern Suburbs. The Gorachoqua had their settlements and routes through from Table Bay, Hout Bay, over the mountain into Retreat, Muizenberg, across the flats and through to today’s Stellenbosch. But the two groups which once were one group and again later after their expulsion from the Peninsular by the Dutch united again – were often alongside each other rather than rigidly separated. Together they numbered around 5000 people.

The Cochoqua social group was of much larger numbers than the other groups and more wealthy in livestock – cattle and sheep. They had more tribal coherence than the other groups and covered a large area starting around the west coast mouth of the Berg River, northwest of Saldahna Bay. Their transhumance route travelled southwards from Saldahna Bay, turning north around today’s Malmesbury until they reached the Berg River again and followed the trajectory of the Berg River back to Vredenberg.

Then there were the Sonqua and Ubiqua hunter groups related to the San (│Xam and !Kun) to which some outcast or drifter Khoi, who were also disparagingly referred to by other Khoi as Goringhaicona (our kin who left us), had become attached. These Sonqua also at times opportunistically kept some cattle usually as a result of raiding the Khoi. The Sonqua largely lived in the northwestern and central areas across the Berg River, but among the Sonqua were those who ventured to the coast and engaged in a line-fishing way of life and living off other seafood and roots. They combed the beaches moving backward and forward along the West Coast as far south as Bloubergstrand and the Salt River. It was these Sonqua who were the real ‘strandlopers’, to use the word that was indiscriminately and manipulatively introduced by the Dutch. Further northwest were lots of micro-groups of (Chari) Griguriqua who were client herders of the numerically and livestock strong Little (N)amacqua peoples whose territory stretched far up to mesh with the Greater Namaqualand and the Gariep and Namibia.

From August 1685 to 20^th January 1686 Simon van der Stel made a trip to little Namaqualand that requires scrutiny. He kept a journal entitled “Simon van der Stel’s Journal of his expedition to Amacqualand 1685 t0 1686.” The term “Amacqualand” was changed in later centuries to read Namaqualand showing that the people van der Stel referred to in his text from just below the Berg River onward as Amacqua were Namaqua. However on Valentines map just west of Saldanha Bay too far south to be (N)amaqua he locates a people called and spelt  Ammaqua (Water People) who clearly are related to Kamesons (Water People).

Van der Stel notes that the (N)amacqua captains that he first on the trip  from 6^th October 1685 shared their kraals with the //Cummison (Kamesons). These people according to Simon van der Stel’s journal protested that they were not Sonqua (San) and their name, //Cummison translates as “Water People”. On the arrival of the Europeans there was hostility and tensions toward them by the Kameson and (N)amacqua who went to great length to mislead the Europeans as to the whereabouts of their kraals even when severely abused and punished. This clearly reflected earlier experiences between these peoples and the Europeans. The Khoi leaders met and named as Captains were identified by the Dutch as – Nonce, Joncker, Rabi, Oedesson, Harramoa, Otwa, Habij and Ace.

Saldanha Bay and surrounds had a fluidity of identity as the result of the territory absorbing refugees from European aggression in the Cape District from Jan van Riebeeck’s time. One such refugee group were the Table Bay //Ammaqua of Autshumao who settled not far from Saldanha Bay among their Cochoqua kinfolk after being driven from the Cape Peninsula. This is not the (N)amacqua that van der Stel talks about but likely to be kin of the Kamesons. As will be seen in this story, Schoemann tells us the story of how the Table Bay Watermans escaped van Riebeeck’s bounty hunters to make their way to Saldanha Bay as did Autshumao after escaping from Robben Island. This chosen place of refuge connects to the fact that Krotoa’s sister, Autshumaoa’s other niece was married to the leader of the Cochoqua.

To the east, the numerically and livestock strong Cape Khoi groups with much stronger tribal coherence were the Chainouqua, Attaqua, (outen) Niqua, Hessequa and the Gonaqua (with Hoengeyqua, Guriqua, Damara and Gamtoos clans). ^{[18]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; Chap 3 pp 49-53; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985).} The latter Gonaqua were also partly incorporated into the southern Xhosa-Khoi people known as the Gqunukhwebe. The Xhosa also had strong familial relationships with the Khoi right down to the Chainouqua where it was difficult to separate Xhosa from Khoi. Before contact with the Europeans there were already 11 Khoi tribes and clans, including the only known Khoi kingdom, that of the Inqua, which had merged into the amaXhosa. ^{[19]Peires J; The House of Phalo – A History of the Xhosa People in their days of Independence;  pp 18-31; Johnathan Ball; Johannesburg (1981).} All of the Khoi, the Xhosa, Thembu, Sotho, Tswana ultimately had historical decent linkages to the Khoi and Kalanga that had emerged on the road to the establishment of the first multi-ethnic state in South Africa at Mapungubwe, which then gave birth in a progression to the Great Zimbabwe, Butwa, Mutapa, Rozvi and Tsonga kingdoms. Trade routes ^{[20]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; pp 1 – 22; pp 62-68; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985) / Read with – Deacon HJ & Deacon S; Human Beginnings in South Africa – Uncovering the secrets of the Stone Age; pp 177-178; David Philp; Cape Town; (1999) / read with Elphich R; KhoiKhoi and the Founding of white South Africa; pp57-68; Raven; (1985) 1-22; pp 62-68; / read with – Huffman TN; Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe: the origin and spread of social complexity in southern Africa. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 28, 37–54; (2009) – read with – Huffman TN; Mapungubwe and the origins of the Zimbabwe culture. In M. Lesley & T.M. Maggs (Eds.), African naissance: The Limpopo Valley 1000 years ago (South African Archaeological Society Goodwin Series 8), pp. 14–29; (2000) / Read with -Huffman T N; Ceramics, settlements, migrations; The African Archaeological Review, 7; pp.155-182} from those origins reached all the way down to Table Bay and from those northern kingdoms they reached out to the world via Mozambique ports – to Arabia, India, Southeast Asia and China. It is unfortunate that knowledge of African social history, particularly that of South Africa, has been blotted out by colonial academia that has placed ‘race’ theories and the antiquity archaeology of Africa as all that existed before the arrival of the Europeans in South Africa. South African museums are void of any due coverage of pre-colonial African history and simply carry archaeological exhibits of iron-age and stone-age. During the first half of the 17^th century in two stages a new formation established itself permanently in Table Bay, as did other independent Khoi livestock farmers such as the wealthy Ankaisoa. First under the leadership of Xhore (Coree), a group of followers from the Gorachoqua and Goringhaiqua began to service the European shipping needs. ^{[21]Cope J; King of the Hottentots; Howard Timmins; Cape Town (1967) / Read with – Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; pp 78 – 82; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985).} After Xhore’s death when this activity fell apart, Autshumao arose with a following to take this activity to a new more organised level. These people called themselves ‖Ammaqua and the Europeans called them Watermans. Colonial historians seem to deliberately blot out this formation and replace them with those they refer to as scavenger ‘strandlopers’.

The micro-context – ‘Strandlooper’ vs ‖Ammaqua founder of the Port of Cape Town?

We need to delve a bit into the core issue of identities at the Cape if we want to understand Autshumao and about his demise when a hastily convened court of the VOC Council of Policy used a cold-case in 1658 to summarily try him and incarcerate him on Robben Island.

It is perhaps important to first note the different formations of indigenous peoples in the geographical circle of influence of the Dutch colonials in the Cape of Good Hope during the mid-17^th century at the Cape of Good Hope. In doing so, I differ with Richard Elphick’s ^{[22]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; pg 94; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985).} somewhat contradictory labelling and description of Autshumao’s people as ‘strandlopers’ and his presumptions about this group.  Elphick ^{[23]South Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White Africa; pg 49; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985).} also adds to the confusion by re-labelling those that van Riebeeck called ‘Capemen’ as ‘Peninsular Khoikhoi’ but at the same time correctly underlining that in 1652 – 1653 when Jan van Riebeeck in his journal first spoke of the Saldanhars he meant all cattle-keeping Khoi on the Cape Peninsular and its surrounds – Goringhaiqua, Gorachoqua and Cochoqua. The latter were much further away rather than on the Cape Peninsular but later Jan van Riebeeck would refer to them as the ‘true Saldanhars’. Why all of this fancy footwork with identities?

We need to navigate different terms for the same people, lest we come to wrong conclusions. Another term in use is the term ‘Goringhaicona’ ^{[24]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; pg 94; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985).} which did not denote a tribe at all and was used disparagingly by Khoi tribes to refer to ‘our kin who left us’ and it was applied not only to the ‖Ammaqua ^{[25]Valentijn F; Reference Map circa 1717 Cape showing the name ‖Ammaqua (Watermans);https://digitalcollections.lib.uct.} (Watermans), but also to a number of independent livestock farmers as well as to less fortunate outcasts who had joined the Sonqua ^{[26]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa; pp 1 – 22; pp 62-68; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985) / read with Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 38-39 H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} migrant line-fishermen combing the beaches. It was a term that simply separated those who lived under the tribal umbrella and authority and those who don’t. Much licence has been taken by some academics around the demographics of the time which treat statements as rigid fact that emanate from van Riebeeck’s journal as opinions, assumptions and perspectives of the VOC Commander which change or modify over the duration of the journal as experience rather than hearsay influences the capture of information.

This distortion is most glaring around the term ‘strandloper’, a slang term applied indiscriminately by Jan van Riebeeck and specifically is contradictorily pinned onto two very different peoples – the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) traders and the Sonqua line-fishermen and straggler Khoi who joined them. Elphick goes further in saying that it can be applied to deserters, outcasts, beggars or scavengers and any who found themselves outside of the tribes.  At times however he projects the same term to be a tribe and misuses the term ‘Goringhaicona’ to sometimes only refer to Autshumao’s people as though this was a tribe called Goringhaiqua. In the 21^st century we now too have people trying to resurrect or revive some entities as though these are all separate tribes, yet they simply are often just labels for the same people pinned onto them by Europeans for narrow political and legal ends that had everything to do with legalising land dispossession. The term ‘strandloper’ was a term of disempowerment, marginalisation and dumbing down. Put another way it is a tool of dispossession.

Here it is important to clarify the demographics of African society in what would quickly became the Dutch  Cape District after 1652. By the beginning of the new 18^th century the cartographic work of Valentijn ^{[27]Valentijn F; Reference Map circa 1717 Cape showing the name ‖Ammaqua (Watermans);https://digitalcollections.} still uses both terms – ‖Ammaqua and Goringhaicona denoting different peoples, but show that they relocated just a little further up the West Coast in the case of the latter and right up beyond Saldahna in the case of the ‖Ammaqua by 1717. At the end of this story we will see why this was the case. An inset map detail within Valentijn’s larger mapped area is a more accurate showing of how by that time the European settlement had totally removed the early Khoi societies. The fact that these names are still used in circa 1717 indicate that either the Peninsular groups or the memory of them was still alive in some way – most likely as Khoi who had been put to flight rather than submit to pacification. In the absence on the map specifically of the Sonqua (San fishermen mixed with Khoi outcasts) it can only be assumed that when referring to Goringhaicona on a map in 1717 there was either still fresh memory of so-called ‘strandlopers’ or there were still some in existence, but this clearly was not the descendants of Autshumao who had moved to Saldahna after the devastating attack by bounty-hunters during the First Khoi-Dutch war in 1659. ^{[28]Schoemann K; Seven Khoi Lives – Cape biographies of the seventeenth century; pp 68-69; Protea; Cape Town; (2009).} Enough evidence exists in the journal of Jan van Riebeeck to illustrate that Autshumao had a rear-base in the vicinity of Saldahna Bay under the patronage of the Cochoqua.

In 1652 there were three groupings that engaged with Jan van Riebeeck, as per a record of a dinner conversation ^{[29]Van Riebeeck R;  Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 38-39 H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} between him and Autshumao  and these effectively practiced three economies at the Cape at the time of first European incursion as colonists – namely hunting-fishing, livestock framing, and trading and servicing. Autshumao was the leader of the latter. These have already been mentioned as the Sonqua line-fishermen wandering community that operated along the beaches from the northern west coast and sometimes as far south as the mouth of the Salt River – ‘strandlopers’. The second group were the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) traders who were a micro-community, residing in Table Bay at the outlet of the freshwater (‖Amma) Camissa River into the sea and who placed a high value on water as the much needed resource by ships. They are a distinct group with their own unique history from those called ‘strandlopers’. The third group that he notes are those that he calls Saldanhars or Capemen. At this time this term simply meant all livestock keeping Khoi on the Peninsular and immediate surrounding district stretching up the West Coast across the bay and up to what they later called the Hottentots Holland Mountains – largely the Gorachoqua and the Goringhaiqua. The term Saldahna at that time was still the Portuguese term for Table Bay, hence it refers to what Elphick labelled as Peninsulars. After the colony was established, the Dutch emphasised the ‘true Saldahna’ and ‘true Saldanhars’ referring to Saldahna Bay and the Cochoqua people.

This earliest demographic summary arose in the context of a dinner held at the Fort between the Van Riebeeck ^{[30]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 38-39 H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} family and the family of Autshumao. It is interesting to read the entire conversation as recorded in van Riebeeck’s journal rather than the commentaries of historians like Elphick who put their own overlay that sometimes misrepresents what is actually said. For example – Jan van Riebeeck notes that from his discussion with Autshumao, in the English language, that the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) were a micro-community residing in Table Bay numbering around 50 people at most. Others note that this community consisted of eighteen men and their wives and children, the core of who were Autshumao’s own family. This illustrates a contradiction in Elphick’s work where he suggests that there was no kinship base to Autshumao’s people, when the facts point to its core being Autshumao, his three wives, his niece and her mother, his sons and their wives. This familial core ^{[31]Robertson, Delia; The First Fifty Years Project. http://e-family.co.za/ffy/g17/p17230.htm} included Autshumao’s son Arre, wife and children, another son Khonomao Namtesij (Claes) and his wife and children, Krotoa the niece of Autshumao, Hemoa Khatimaἅ, Hum Tha Saankhumma, Khamy, Lubbert, Beijmakoukoa Danhou, Boubo and Thoe Mak Koa.

Jan van Riebeeck references the European term ‘Watermans’ and not the indigenous name ‖Ammaqua, in the same way that he uses ‘Herri’ and not the indigenous name Autshumao. He does however note that Autshumao and his people refer to themselves as Watermans, and thus this is not an imposed name. The indigenous term ‖Ammaqua for this group is used by Valentijn his early detailed map of the Cape Colony circa 1717. The maps of Valentijn and others of those times are well known more for their beauty than being absolutely historically or geographically correct, hence one uses them with some caution for cross referencing. But what is useful however is that these maps do give us the names of the various indigenous African people of the Cape District with more clarity than can be found elsewhere and they offer some tell-tale information as to what happened to various peoples after the 1659 war. The assumption was that all the Peninsular peoples disintegrated at that time and either were pacified or became identity-less refugees.

The ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) were the shoreline frontier community of traders and facilitators who assisted the constant stream of ships making compulsory refreshment stops at the Cape of Good Hope. They were not ‘strandlopers’ scavenging on the beaches. Colonial historians have tended to go along with van Riebeeck’s non-recognition of the actual business role of Autshumao and his people by equating them with the beach-comber Sonqua and stragglers who joined them from other Khoi groups, regardless of the fact that in van Riebeeck’s journal he notes that Autshumao identified the Sonqua or ‘Strandloper’ fishermen as his enemy. Indeed Autshumao pleaded with van Riebeeck to assist him against the fishermen. It is these contradictions in the primary texts that are important to note before we proceed further with the story of Autshumao. The frequency of the references in Van Riebeeck’s journal of linking Autshumao and the Watermans (‖Ammaqua) makes in indisputable that this was the expressed identity of Autshumao and his people and not ‘strandloper’ or ‘Goringhaicona’.

The macro-context – keeping the eye on the bigger African picture

As much as there needed to be clarity on the micro-context it is also important to gain some clearer picture about bigger context of Africa and the relationships of its people right down south to the rest of the continent and African people across the continent. The European has always projected the south as almost being a different and unrelated territory to the rest of Africa.

Colonial/Apartheid academia from various disciplines rigidly separated the Africans of South Africa into ‘race-silos’ that coincided with supposed rigid economic modes of sustaining themselves. So we were told that there were hunter-gatherers who made up a ‘race’ called San or Bushmen; then we were told that there were herders who made up a ‘race’ called Khoi; and finally farmers with metallurgical skills who were a ‘race’ called Bantu and there was no mixing between these people who were mortal enemies. The latter we were told were alien invaders who suddenly swooped down from Nigeria and Cameroon via the Great Lakes in Central Africa in the fifteenth century.

This paradigm of thinking is part of the bedrock of Apartheid that still dominates the historical information and discourse space in South Africa. Conveniently it places the European colonist in a position where they supposedly came to the rescue of the ‘brown-races’ against the marauding sub-Saharan ‘black races’.

A somewhat different story unfolds when one takes a multi-disciplinary approach to African social history, ethnic history, linguistic history, genetics, paleo art, archaeology, anthropology, oral history and so on. There really were no ‘three’ moulds ever. As much as there were hunters, there were herder-hunters and fishermen-hunter-herders; herders too were often engaged in both hunting and farming; and as much as there were farmers there were farmer-herders and hunter-herder-farmers. As much as people gathered roots, bulbs, leaves, fruits there were gatherers who tried their hands at cultivation, and farmers who foraged at times too because that is how domestication of crops started. While there were broad modes of sustenance and production, the notion of solid walls locking peoples into such modes of living for all time and these coinciding with notions of identity constructs called ‘race’, and with ethnicity and cultural practices has no sound academic/scientific basis.

The conflation of broad families of languages and the notion of ‘race’ that has then been laid on the three silos became an aberration in its next step. Those who thought in this manner began a debate on whether ‘San/Bushmen’ and ‘Khoi/Hottentot’ were two separate so-called ‘races’ or one. In the beginning of the 20^th century a German zoologist dabbling in anthropology decided that there was a single Khoisan ‘race’ that was part human and part beast. He argued that this race was contaminating the human race and should be exterminated. This ‘Khoisan’ line of thinking was soon taken up by Isaac Schapera who also expounded an erroneous linguistic theory that found resonance with the racist theories of Leonard Schultz. ^{[32]Schultz L; Aus Namaland und Kalahari; Berlin (1907) / Read with –  Olusoga D & Erichsen C W; The Kaiser’s Holocaust – Germany’s forgotten genocide and the colonial roots of Nazism; pg 205Faber & Faber; London (1988).}

Schultz was the creator of this ‘Khoisan’ notion which spread like wildfire within academia. He had carried out live experiments on the Nama in concentration camps in Namibia during the genocide by the Germans on the Nama and Herero peoples. Everything in the studies available to us shouts out that while there are broad families of ethnicities that can be loosely called ‘San’ and ‘Khoi’, they are neither absolute or rigid ‘races’ nor are they simply a single so-called ‘race’ or people or nation called ‘Khoisan’. Yet academia continues in this vein, disregard the protest of the San communities in particular. There never was nor is there a ‘Khoisan’ people or nation. It is a complete fabrication. There are distinct communities referred to the San family of peoples with a particular history, heritage and culture, and distinct communities referred to as the Khoi family of peoples with their particular history, heritage and culture. Why it is further important to note this distinction is that among those who persecuted and committed genocide against the San family of peoples, record shows that the Khoi were also perpetrators of these crimes

Likewise there are more than 400 ethnicities that connect to the Bantu family of languages and there are no absolute rigid walls between Bantu language speakers and ethnic groups who are San or Khoi. Bantu too are not a people, nation or ethnic group. While predominantly ‘San’ engage as hunter-gatherers to sustain themselves there are those who also engaged in herding and farming. Not all ‘San’ peoples are nomadic without permanent abode and neither are all Khoi herders and all Bantu language speakers farmers. It is also not the culture of any people to be locked forever in one moment in time and stereotyped. It is very important that we extricate our enquiry on the past from racist theory and framing.

Pseudo-scientific reasoning imbued with colonial patronisation and notions of the noble savage, and civilised vs un-civilised in a hierarchy of worth based on ‘race’ has grievously damaged our ability to have discourse in a meaningful way between those who were subject of this thinking and those who subjected people to this reasoning. The Sonqua line-fishermen labelled ‘strandlopers’ have been made subject to this overlord debate and this occurred because Jan van Riebeeck and the VOC were wrestling with how they could in international law make the case of occupying land lawfully as no settled  people in their opinion had just claim to it. The term ‘Khoisan’ was an attempt to assimilate diverse peoples into a common inferior identity that could be marginalised and deprived of their rights – it was no different to the use of the term ‘strandlooper’.  Right into the late 19^th century hunting licences were still being issued to hunt ‘Bushmen’ (San) along with kudu and springboks. That is how far the manipulation of identity and the use of dehumanisation tactics was practiced by Europeans on Africans.

However as contradictions got the better of him, Jan van Riebeeck dispensed with the approach of trying to intellectually obliterate identities and fell back on the law of conquest at the time of Autshumao’s incarceration in 1658 on the basis of the resolution of the cold-case of 1653. The VOC Chamber of 17 however, had tried to avoid a war scenario and still preferred a legal-intellectual approach rather than the ‘by the sword approach’ and, were annoyed with Jan van Riebeeck’s mishandling of Autshumao and relations with the Watermans which they believe was the real reason for the start of the first Khoi-Dutch war. ^{[33]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White Africa; pg 111; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985).} The VOC changed the Commander at the Cape within 18 months after the conflict situation had quietened down. But the clock could not be turned back and the trajectory remained ‘forced removals’ – the legacy of Jan van Riebeeck.

At his dinner conversation recorded in his journal on 13 November 1652, Jan van Riebeeck ^{[34]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 38-39 H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} while entertaining Autshumao and his family used the opportunity to elicit information and verify information. Jan van Riebeeck seeks to give the impression that the tiny community of Watermans were located in three different locations mainly behind Table Mountain and behind Lions Head and not just in Table Bay indicating that they were just another branch of wandering beachcombers. It is most unlikely given how tiny the ‖Ammaqua community was that they would split up in this manner and it reinforces the notion that van Riebeeck was trying to project that there was no prior claim to Table Bay or the port because the Watermans were from elsewhere. As their name indicates they are associated with fresh drinking water and this locates them at the river in Table Bay. It also does not connect them to seawater which has another name in the Nama, !Ora and Khoekhoegowab languages. There is no ambiguity.

Autshumao’s community and his own innovation and entrepreneurship has also got to be seen in the context of pre-colonial social history of the peopling of Southern Africa at a time before the creation of borders in Southern Af Rui Ka by the Europeans.

The name Af Rui Ka is said to go back to ancient black kingdom of Kemet, later known as Egypt, and its meaning is roughly ‘the birthplace of humanity’. ^{[35]Massey G; A book of the beginnings Vol 1; (1881).} Later Greeks, Romans and Arabs all developed variants of the name Africa and it withstood the sands of time. Humanity is said to have first emerged along the east coastline of Africa, spread to the rest of Africa and across the world. Migration thus became part of the dna footprint of humanity and wherever humans migrated and settled, fresh drinking water – ‖amma, was always central to human habitat for without drinking water humans would die.

Like in most parts of the world, human settlements in Southern Africa occurred along major rivers and intersections of the rivers and the ocean. The peopling of Southern Africa firstly goes back to antiquity and then secondly to another set of events from the last millennium BCE. Two of the major waterways – the Zambezi and the Limpopo around the confluence of the Shashe and Limpopo, were the habitat of peoples whose origins go back to antiquity as micro social formations evolving from the first homo-sapiens. These were the Khwe, Tshwa, Tshua or abaTwa hunters (San peoples) respectively. ^{[36]Le Roux W & White A edt; Voices of the San; inside cover, locations of San of Southern Africa; Kwela Books; (2004).} Such San communities of various ethnicities also were to be found all over South Africa as distinctly different ethnic communities with different names and micro sub-cultures.

From around 1000 BCE a slow migratory drift ^{[37]Hall M; Farmers, kings and traders: the peoples of southern Africa, 200–1860. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (1990) M. Hall, The Changing Past: Farmers, Kings and Traders in Southern Africa, 200 –1860 (Cape Town, David Philip, 1987), p. 31.} took place, first of descendants of East African herders of Nilotic origins, shortly followed by multi-ethnic farmers with metallurgical skills from Angola (Kalundu cultures), the Great Lakes (Nkope cultures) and East Africa (Kwale cultures). ^{[38]Huffman T N; Ceramics, settlements, migrations; The African Archaeological Review, 7; pp.155-182 ; Map Figure 3 New EIA assignments. Pg 161;} The latter three cultures, noted by their different pottery designs, spoke languages that can be noted as being part of the 400 ethnicities that make up the family of Bantu language speakers. Their DNA forms branches of Sub-Saharan African dna spread over broad regions of much of Africa. Archaeologists ^{[39]Binneman J, Webley L & Biggs V; Preliminary notes on an early iron age site in the Great Kei River Valley, Eastern Cape; South Africa Field Archaeology – Issue 2; 1: pp 108-109; (1992) / read with – 44 Steel J; First Millinnium agriculturalist ceramics of the Eastern Cape, South Africa – An investigation; Unisa MA; (2001).} demonstrate that such groups were present at various places in South Africa by 350 CE and as far south as East London by 650 CE engaging in farming, metallurgy and ceramic production.The descendants of the herders who originally left East Africa hundreds of years before, engaged with the Tshua or Tshwa (abaTwa) hunters around 200 BCE and it is from this engagement that the Khoi hunter-herder people emerged and would migrate to Botswana and Namibia, and all along both sides of the Limpopo as far as the Indian Ocean, where they became one of the foundation peoples of many new societies that would spring up. ^{[40]Sadr K; Invisible herders – The archaeology of Khoekhoe pastoralists; School of Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand; Southern African Humanities Vol. 20 Page 192;Pietermaritzburg; (2008)  / read with – Schlebusch C; Lactase persistence alleles reveal ancestry of Southern African Khoe pastoralists; Uppsala Bio Life Science Pathfinder; [journal/ April] (2014). Read with – Carina M. Schlebusch, Pontus Skoglund, Per Sj ̈odin, Lucie M. Gattepaille, Dena Hernandez, Flora Jay, Sen Li, Michael De Jongh, Andrew Singleton, Michael G. B. Blum, Himla Soodyall, and Mattias Jakobsson. Genomic variation in seven Khoe-San groups reveals adaptation and complex African history. Science (New York, N.Y.) , 338(6105):374–379, October 2012./ read with – Eastwood EB & Smith BW;Fingerprints of the Khoekhoen: Geometric and Handprinted Rock Art in the Central Limpopo Basin, Southern Africa; Goodwin Series, Vol. 9, Further Approaches to Southern African Rock Archaeological Society Art ; pp. 63-76; (2005) /  read with –  Smith BW & Ouzman S; Taking Stock: Identifying Khoekhoen Herder Rock Art in Southern Africa; Current Anthropology; 45:4, pp 499-526 Univ Chicago Press (2004) South African Archaeological Society / read with – Schlebusch C; Lactase persistence alleles reveal ancestry of Southern African Khoe pastoralists; Uppsala Bio Life Science Pathfinder; (2014).}

All South African tribal identities today include Khoi roots. At the western Limpopo on the south side, the Tshua and the Khoi were joined by the migratory drift of farmers around 350 CE. Multi-ethnic and multi-cultural sets of societies emerged in a progression from 350 CE until 900 CE. These cultures include those identified by archaeologists, by means of the different types of fragments of their cultures left as markers, as – Ziwa, Zizho and finally Kalanga cultures. ^{[41]Huffman TN; Mapungubwe and the origins of the Zimbabwe culture. In M. Lesley & T.M. Maggs (Eds.), African naissance: The Limpopo Valley 1000 years ago (South African Archaeological Society Goodwin Series 8), pp. 14–29; (2000). / read with – Schoeman MH & Pikirayi I: Repatriating more than Mapungubwe human remains: Archaeological material culture, a shared future and an artificially divided past; Schoeman, Department of Archaeology, School of Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand; Pikirayi, Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of Pretoria;https://repository.up.ac.za/ / read with – Calabrese J.A; Interregional interaction in southern Africa: Zhizo and Leopard’s Kopje relations in northern South Africa, southwestern Zimbabwe and eastern Botswana, AD 1000 to 1200. African. Archaeological Review 17(4): 183–210. (2000).} Break-away migrants from this progression moved into Botswana, and also down to today’s Gauteng, to Lesotho, Free State, Northern Cape and to as far down in the Eastern Cape as East London by 650 CE. ^{[42]Binneman J, Webley L & Biggs V; Preliminary notes on an early iron age site in the Great Kei River Valley, Eastern Cape; South Africa Field Archaeology – Issue 2; 1: pp 108-109; (1992) / read with –  Steel J; First Millinnium agriculturalist ceramics of the Eastern Cape, South Africa – An investigation; Unisa MA; (2001).} From this scenario Khoi and proto-Kalanga thrived alongside each other as farmer and herder societies but these in their migrations had displaced San societies like the Ju, !Kun and ǀXam also known as abaTwa who had been the surviving societies that go back to the earliest homo sapiens in the region.

The same happened in KZN ^{[43]Francis M; Silencing the past: historical and archaeological colonisation of the Southern San in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; Anthropology Southern Africa, 32(3-4), 106–116.https://doi.org/10.1080/23323256.2009.11499985;} where early Khoi herder and the migratory drift of early farmers displaced the ǀXegwi (San) also known as abaTwa. By 1050 CE migrant Khoi societies had reached the Western Cape by both east and west routes. ^{[44]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White Africa; pp 3-42; Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985).} Again these Khoi migrants displaced the original Cape San people who had lived in the coastal regions ^{[45]Stow G; The Native Races of South Africa: A history of the intrusion of the Hottentots and Bantu into the hunting grounds of the Bushmen – the aborigines of the Country; Struik; Cape Town (1964).} . By the time of European incursion 600 years later most Cape San of Eastern Cape and Western Cape had be pushed into the drier and mountainous Central Cape also known as ǀXamka or Bushmanland. After the first millennium the formation occurred of the first multi-ethnic and multi-cultural South African state at Mapungubwe where San, Khoi and Kalanga (Bantu language speakers) lived in a stratified society and where the San had a niche role in Royal or upper class society as rainmakers and spiritual guides.

Parsons ^{[46]Parsons N; A new history of Southern Africa; pp25-36; McMillan; (1980).} shows us how this first state gave rise to successive states at Great Zimbabwe, Thulamela, Butwa, Mutapa and elsewhere opening up 700 years of kingdom formations. These occurred as a result of circular migrations within Southern Africa, supplemented by continued slow migratory drifts. In the first few centuries of the second millennium Tswana, Sotho, Pedi, Venda, Ndebele, Tonga, Tsonga, Shona and Shangaan societies emerged from this as did northern Nguni societies such as the Swazi, Hlubi, Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, and Zulu peoples.

But many super societies in the form of kingdoms and even an empire emerged in this process. The northern Nguni language speakers were not a monolithic invader people who suddenly arrived in South Africa as colonial historians have claimed but rather a South African people which emerged from complex old circular micro migratory drifts and developments that brought San, Khoi, Kalanga, Bokoni peoples, Tsonga, Hlubi and Rozvi eMbo together to form the many kingdoms in the area.

Later Shaka from the tiny Zulu clan carried the earlier traditions and innovations of the maMbos of the Rozvi Empire. ^{[47]Huffman TN; Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe: the origin and spread of social complexity in southern Africa. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 28, 37–54; (2009) – read with – Huffman TN; Mapungubwe and the origins of the Zimbabwe culture. In M. Lesley & T.M. Maggs (Eds.), African naissance: The Limpopo Valley 1000 years ago (South African Archaeological Society Goodwin Series 8), pp. 14–29; (2000).} Shaka was not the inventor of the short stabbing spear nor the horning military tactics which has an older history. The Rozvi (destroyers) can be traced back to the Kalanga that emerged to form the Mapungubwe State, and the successor Butwa state. The term Mfecane (the crushing) is remarkably similar to the meaning of Rozvi.

The Kalanga ^{[48]Schoeman MH & Pikirayi I: Repatriating more than Mapungubwe human remains: Archaeological material culture, a shared future and an artificially divided past; Schoeman, Department of Archaeology, School of Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand; Pikirayi, Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of Pretoria; https://repository.up.ac.za/ / read with – Calabrese J A; Inter-regional interaction in southern Africa: Zhizo and Leopard’s Kopje relations in northern South Africa / read with – Huffman TN; Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe: the origin and spread of social complexity in southern Africa. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 28, 37–54 (2009)  / read with – Parsons N; A new history of Southern Africa; pp25-36; McMillan; (1980).} started the Great Zimbabwe kingdom, the Butwa kingdom and the Mutapa Kingdom on the historical road to the formation of the Rozvi Empire which indelibly influenced all Southern African social formations. It is a long complex social history which was papered over by colonialism using a vulgar caricature of a mass Bantu invasion of a relatively unpopulated South Africa of the 15th century. All of this progression of African social history, together, is part of the complexity of the peopling of South Africa. Pre-colonial African history was suppressed until fairly recently while the ideologically impregnated empty-land doctrine became the mainstay of schooling and academia.

Evidence shows that the most developed region of Southern Africa was the pre-Mapungubwe Ziwa-Zizho-Kalanga cultures which was a progression of social development between 800 – 1000 CE along the Limpopo River in South Africa. ^{[49]Huffman T; Mapela, Mapungubwe and the origin of States in Southern Africa; The South Africican Archaeological Bulletin; Vol 70 No:201 (June 2015) pp15-27} Evidence also shows that trade between South Africans via intermediaries on the east coast of Africa in Mozambique, had opened up access to Arab, Indian, Southeast Asian and Chinese markets. ^{[50]Huffman TN; Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe: the origin and spread of social complexity in southern Africa. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 28, 37–54; (2009) – read with – Huffman TN; Mapungubwe and the origins of the Zimbabwe culture. In M. Lesley & T.M. Maggs (Eds.), African naissance: The Limpopo Valley 1000 years ago (South African Archaeological Society Goodwin Series 8), pp. 14–29; (2000).}

By the time of the multi-ethnic first South African state of Mapungubwe ^{[51]Hall M; Farmers, kings and traders: the peoples of southern Africa, 200–1860. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (1990) / read with –  Ashley N. Coutu AN, Whitelaw G, le Roux P, & Sealy J; Earliest Evidence for the Ivory Trade in Southern Africa: Isotopic and Zoo MS Analysis of Seventh–Tenth Century ad Ivory from KwaZulu-Natal; African Archaeological Review; December 2016, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp 411–435; (2016) / read with – Marilee Wood, Interconnections: Glass Beads and Trade in Southern and Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean—7th to 16th Centuries AD (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 2011).} (900 CE – 1100 CE)  this trade between early organised South African society and the Indian Ocean and Eastern world, was relatively advanced, and gold, ivory and animal skins from Africa were much wanted products abroad. This was long before the Europeans had found the sea-route to the east and had developed economic relations with much of the world.

The situation changed for the Europeans in the late 15th century, but for the next few centuries this opening up of Asia to Europe was dominated by competitive and conflictual aggression between European powers in Asia. From the latter years of the first millennium trading lines operated in a chain down inland from the west coast and also inland along the east coast all the way to the Western Cape and Cape Peninsula. When Xhore and Autshumao (primarily serving the British) and Isaac (serving the Dutch) had gone abroad they attained global experience. But prior to these events, indigenous South African communities had traded with the outside world through intermediaries at Mozambique ports and Angolans had travelled worldwide in the 16th century.

The beginnings of a new economy and port in Table Bay

Just like the story of the peopling that occurred along the Zambezi and Limpopo, Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua story alongside the Camissa River in Cape Town is also a story of a social revolution. Van Riebeeck established the reference to Autshumao as ‘strandloper’ simply as a means to convey in the record that no indigenous people lay claim to the Table Bay area, but already by this time other earlier records contradict the journal as will be shown. Effectively Jan van Riebeeck attempted to blot out the social revolution at Table Bay between 1590 – 1652 by disparaging the role of Autshumao, and his general attitude towards the Peninsular Khoi was one in which he likened the Khoi to unintelligent, dirty, savages and beasts. ^{[52]Trotter H M; Vols. 8 & 9: 30-44. Journal of African Travel-Writing Sailors as Scribes Travel discourse and the contextualisation of the Khoikhoi at the Cape 1649-90; (2001);}

As one gets more familiar with the van Riebeeck journal, discrepancies arise but also it can be noted that there are plenty of give-away lines about the contestation of the views of the Dutch commander. Van Riebeeck ^{[53]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 37 H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} for instances says that:

“Herri in the meanwhile, priding himself on having originated the incipient trade (at Table Bay), proceeds to the Saldanhars, no good expected from it, as he proposes to have as brokerage a copper plate of 1 lb. for every animal bartered – will humour him to find him out.”

This statement is overlooked or downplayed by historians who have constructed a ‘Jan van Riebeeck – founder of Cape Town’ story for which Autshumao’s story presents an inconvenient truth.

Far from being beachcombers, the Watermans or ‖Ammaqua were an entrepreneurial people who valued independence and followed a different economic means of survival outside of the herding or hunting tribe mode, of which they were proud. They were the human manifestation of a social and economic revolution of their times. They were writing a new story in African social history. Through their interactions with many tens of thousands of European visitors over a half century the ‖Ammaqua and Xhore’s people before them, established the proto port character of Table Bay as a refreshment and service support offering in Table Bay.
Over this time, with such huge shipping traffic as will be demonstrated, there also would have been sexual unions from which children of mixed ancestry were also born of travelling African, Asian and European fathers by Khoi women at the Camissa settlement. There is an incorrect assumption that sailor crews were all Europeans, whereas historical record ^{[54]Pereira C; Black Liberators: The Role of Africans & Arabs sailors in the Royal Navy within the Indian Ocean 1841-1941: Geographical Society, London, United Kingdom – Download PDF here – Read with – Ross, Emma George. “The Portuguese in Africa, 1415–1600.” In Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–. http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/agex/hd_agex.htm (October 2002) / Read with – Earle T F & Lowe JP edt; Black Africans in Renaissance Europe; Cambridge University Press, (2005).} indicate a strong component of more experienced, African, Indian Southeast Asian and Arab seamen. A number of recorded traveller narratives attest to children and people in Table Bay having features considered by Europeans to be Mestizo or Mulatto. ^{[55]Tavernier JB Vol2 p 304. edt V Ball and William Crooke 1925. Travels in India. / Read with Mundy P. edt Sir Richard Carnac Temple Vink M (2003). The World’s oldest trade: Dutch Slavery and slave trade in the Indian Ocean in the 17th Century. Journal of World History Rpr (1967). P 327 The travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia 1698 -1667 / Read with Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 137 H.C.V. Leibrandt;  Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} These are the earliest roots of today’s Camissa people – African creole people still labelled by the derogatory colonial and Apartheid term ‘Coloured’.

Elphick ^{[56]Elphick R. Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pg82; Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).} projects a story that there is record of only 42 shipping accounts from which one can glean the story of engagements between indigenous people and Europeans, whereas more meticulous research ^{[57]Gaastra FS and Bruijn JR (1993). pp 179, 182-183. The Dutch East India Company’s Shipping 1602 – 1795 in a comparative perspective. Ships, sailors and spices: East India Companies and their shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Amsterdam. http://www.vijfeeuwenmigratie.nl/sites/default/files/bronnen/dutcheastindia177-193.pdf} of shipping records and travel facts show us over 1071 outward bound ships stopping at the Cape, with around 700 homeward bounds stop-overs. This kind of scant attention to detail and glossing over of facts while over-playing the dominant European narrative results in a skewing of history that simply sees the Khoi in terms of a prelude to “…the Founding of White South Africa” as Elphick’s work is entitled. Elphick also gathers facts from many of the same sources used here but arranges his story differently and comes to erroneous conclusions contradicted by the primary texts. The different lenses that we use to look at the past alter the perspective.

Xhore of the Gorachoqua/Goringhaiqua had been kidnapped by the English in 1613 and taken on board HMS Hector to London and then brought back to the Cape of Good Hope. This had been done on the instruction of Sir Thomas Smythe of the English East India Company. ^{[58]Cope J. (1967) King of the Hottentots, Howard Timmins, Cape Town. Read with Elphick R. pg79. Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa. Raven Press. Johannesburg} After his return, Xhore was supposed to facilitate the English East India Company’s attempt to establish a colony with ten English convicts from Newgate Prison, under Captains Peyton and Crosse. The colony project failed miserably, but Xhore remained the point-person for the English for a decade. In 1626 he is said to have been murdered by the Dutch after he refused to assist them. It is at the end of this era that the door opened the opportunity for Autshumao’s career as the new point man for the English East India Company. Most South Africans are unware that an indigenous African from South Africa had gone to London as early as 1613.

Xhore of the Gorachoqua/Goringhaiqua was the first known indigenous South African to travel, under force, to London in 1613 on board HMS Hector and was returned to the Cape of Good Hope in 1614. ^{[59]Cope J. (1967) King of the Hottentots, Howard Timmins, Cape Town. Read with Elphick R. pg79. Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; Raven Press; Johannesburg} But throughout the previous 120 years many West Africans had travelled to Europe and the Americas and many East Africans had travelled to East Asia. Between 1600 and 1652 the people of Table Bay would certainly have met African and Asian seamen as most European ships crews were experienced Africans and Arabs.

It was alongside a river way down in the south – namely the Camissa River running from Table Mountain to the sea in Table Bay that became a new focal point of a most dramatic coming together of peoples, in the peopling of South Africa during the 17^th century and beyond. The motive forces that led to this new chapter in the peopling of South Africa was the expansion of European trade and influence in Asia, whereby the Cape of Good Hope and its people provided a much needed re-provisioning service as a halfway refreshment station for international shipping. By far the most important personality of this time is our subject, Autshumao of the ‖Ammaqua whose career began when he journeyed from the Cape of Good Hope to Banten (Bantam) in Java. ^{[60]Elphick R;  Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pg 79 Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).}

Autshumao and the Java experience

By mid-1500 the Arab world had also extended imperial and Islamic influence eastwards to India and Southeast Asia which clashed with European trade expansion, colonisation and Christian proselytization activity in the east. According to Barbara Andaya and Leonard Andaya ^{[61]Andaya BW & Andaya LY; pg134; A history of early modern Southeast Asia 1400-1830. Cambridge University Press.(2015).} (pg 134) in 1494 the great Catholic powers – Portugal and Spain, through the Treaty of Tordesillas agreed to a division of the world beyond Europe. Under Papal Patronage the two crowns undertook to spread the Catholic faith in newly discovered lands. Java and Makassar in Sulawesi became one of the centres of the clash of Christianity and Islam when the Portuguese first made its presence felt in 1522.

The Portuguese, however, did not make much headway because by the end of the 16^th century the Arab Muslim influence had a firm foothold and Portuguese stature as the dominant European power in the east was on the decrease. In 1596 the Dutch first asserted themselves in Indonesia and were to dominate until the end of the mid-18^th century when the English became the rising imperial power.

By the early 1600s the Dutch were way ahead of the English. Nonetheless the English East India Company was rapidly increasing as an economic threat to the Dutch. Barbara and Leonard Andaya ^{[62]Andaya BW & Andaya LY; pg202-206; A history of early modern Southeast Asia 1400-1830. Cambridge University Press (2015).} tell us that by 1603 the English had a strong presence and factory in Banten (Bantam) in Java which they operated until the Dutch evicted them in 1682. Banten (Bantam) in West Java was an international centre of trade under Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa. The Dutch plotted together with the Sultan’s son who took over from his father by military means by using the VoC troops from Batavia (Jakarta) to secure victory and this calculated act led to the expulsion of other Europeans, especially the English. The religious leader who had opposed the Dutch expansion in the region – the charismatic Muslim intellectual Sheikh Yusuf of Makassar ^{[63]Mansoor J: Guide to the Kramats of the Western Cape; pp 17 -19; Cape Mazaar Society; Cape Town (1996).} – was forcibly exiled to the Cape Colony in 1683 where he remain for the rest of his life and became the founding father for the Islamic faith in South Africa.

It was to this British port at Banten (Bantam) in 1630 that the English took Autshumao as an intern to become their agent at the Cape of Good Hope. It is here that Autshumao would learn about European rivalry, strengths and weakness. He further learnt the value of getting to know the different languages of these powers in this international centre of trade, because all of them – English, Dutch, Portuguese, French and Danish had to stop over at the Cape of Good Hope.

Autshumao would have encountered those called Black Portuguese ^{[64]Andaya BW & Andaya LY. (2015) A history of early modern Southeast Asia 1400-1830. Cambridge University Press.} , known as Topasses or Mardijkers, who were the offspring of Portuguese men and East Asians. He would also have encountered African and Southeast Asian slaves who are likely to have left a great impression on him as a person regarded as a Free Black in the East and would have made him value his freedom. He further would have come to appreciate how important the Cape of Good Hope was as a halfway refreshment station to European trade in spices, silk and slaves. This would further have enlightened him as to the value that could be placed on local required commodities from the Cape. Indeed from 1615 the Cape was a compulsory maritime stop-over port. In understanding all of this, Autshumao would clearly have seen opportunities as well as threats and, this period of education and training would serve Autshumao very well when he returned to the Cape to establish the first indigene run proto-port operation. Much later when the VOC commander Jan van Riebeeck bullied him out of the port operations, van Riebeeck himself notes in his journal that Herri challenged the Dutch Commander’s usurping of his project. ^{[65] Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 37 H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

Given all of this background it should be apparent that the disparaging remarks about Autshumao being an ignorant and crooked, dirty good-for-nothing beach scavenger when engaging with van Riebeeck and his VOC party at the Cape from 1652, is nothing but crude colonial distortion. So what then is the story of Autshumao?

Autshumao – agent of the English, entrepreneur and Governor at the Cape

It can be deduced that Autshumao was born around 1605 – 1610 and as a child grew up with the Gorachouqua/Goringhaiqua people who had pioneered the earliest trading relationships with European ships under Xhore. Around the age of 20 – 25 years Autshumao agreed to accompany the English to their factory in Banten (Bantam) in Java ^{[66]Elphick R;  Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pg 79 Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).} where he learnt much from them and also about the other Europeans.

This opportunity had come his way having been prompted by favourable experiences that the English had when stopping over at the Cape since their early trips in 1602. In 1613, Aldworth ^{[67] Best Thomas. Edt Foster William (1934). 251 The Voyage of Thomas Best to the East Indies, 1612-1614 – Letter of Aldworth Thomas at Surat 1613 to Sir Thomas Smythe. Asian educational Services. Delhi} , a champion for English Settlement at the Cape who was President and Factor of the English Factory in Surat, stated in a letter to the English East India Company in relation to the Cape of Good Hope:

“… the climate is very healthy, insomuch that when we arrived there with many of our people sick, they all regained their health and strength within twenty days”. Furthermore, the letter states, “… we found the natives of the country to be very courteous and tractable folk, and they did not give us the least annoyance during the time we were there.”

In the period 1610 to 1620, English ships stopping at Table Bay increased by ten times the number of the previous decade which impressed upon the English East India Company that they needed to have a trustworthy agent at the Cape of Good Hope to serve shipping needs.

There are many different reports from the beginning of the 17^th century that paint the picture of European engagement with the Cape Khoi people. Theal ^{[68]Theal G M (1887). Pp 25-26. History of South Africa 1486-1691. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. London} tells us of Joris Spilbergen, commander of the Dutch fleet, who gave Table Bay its name on a visit in 1601. He mentions sick sailors being conveyed to land where a hospital was established. Raven-Hart ^{[69]Raven-Hart R.1967. pp23-40 Before van Riebeeck: Callers at South Africa from 1488 to 1652. Cape Town: Struik} provides the figures of 1 839 sheep and 149 cattle being traded to four ships between 1601 and 1608. Tavernier ^{[70]Tavernier JB. p 205. The Six Travels of Jean Baptista Tavernier. trans. J. P. (London: R. L. and M. P. 1678).} reports:

“So soon as the ship arrives, they [the Cape Khoi] bring their beasts to the shore with what other commodities they have, to barter….”.

After being shipwrecked with sixty-two men in 1647 and remaining at Table Bay for almost a year, Captain Leendert  Janzsen reported to the VOC that the natives came in friendship to trade with them. ^{[71]Theal G M (1887). p32. History of South Africa 1486-1691. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. London}

Initially the English clumsily attempted to establish a colony at Table Bay with Newgate convicts but this effort went horribly wrong and failed. While Chief Xhore served the English well as an independent African trader for a decade, his demise around 1626 led to the English recruiting Autshumao to replace the vital services once supplied by Xhore.

Richard Elphick ^{[72]Elphick R;  Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pg 82  Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985}) shows a negative effect on economic relations between the Europeans and the Khoi as a result of Chief Xhore’s death, just at the time that their shipping was increasing. The value of having point men or agents providing services at the Cape was underscored by the loss of Chief Xhore. It was also of benefit to the larger and wealthy livestock herders and breeders that there was some kind of security buffer trading community that stood between themselves and the foreign travellers. It was these circumstances that provided the backdrop to Autshumao’s trip to Banten (Bantam) in Java with the English. Unlike in the case of his predecessor Xhore who had been abducted, the trip by Autshumao with the English East India Company was seemingly a voluntary response by a free African to recruitment.

Besides his experiences in Java the voyage that Autshumao ^{[73] Elphick R;  Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pg 84  Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).} took in 1630, and return voyage at the end of 1631, would have been of much educational value for Autshumao. Autshumao was in his early 20s when he left for Java. Ships travelling to the East made stops along the way on the East African Coast at busy ports such as Kilwa in Mozambique and another hallway stop at Mauritius, before the long stretch to West Java. This gave Autshumao a good idea of travel, trade and different cultures and societies in Africa and Asia. It would have been a life changing experience for him and it gave him all of the basics about what was required in running a port.

Autshumao saw that ships and the travellers had multiple needs. Besides a sojourn and hospitality, the ships required fresh water, meat, salt, and timber for repairs. They required lay-over time and shore leave for their sick as well as indigenous knowledge about medicinal plants. They required a postal communication service and required that sometimes they leave the sick behind until recuperated enough to continue a voyage on another vessel. He also ascertained that because these different Europeans were not always friendly to each other, there was the potential for conflicts when different nationalities were in port at the same time. All of these things were already a reality at the Cape of Good Hope.

The result for indigenous people was vulnerability requiring protective measures and, it also was a time pregnant with possibilities. New commodities such as skillets, kettles, pots, knives and other wares as well as the direct availability of copper, brass and iron, no longer dependent on the cross country trade routes, was to change the economy at the Cape of Good Hope quite drastically. ^{[74]Elphick R;  Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pp 72-82 Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).} The value of fresh water to the ships was something Autshumao particularly would have noted. Effectively he learnt that whoever controlled the fresh water controlled the trade. The brand that he developed for his small following clearly identified these traders with water as ‖Ammaqua or Watermans. The European’s need for salt would also lead to the production and collection of salt for sale, something not previously done. Autshumao and others noted that individual livestock farming could be lucrative as could intermediary trading between such farmers or the tribal authorities. This was a social and economic revolution at Table Bay in the fifty year period prior to the establishment of the Dutch colony in 1652.

According to Gaastra and Bruijn ^{[75]Gaastra FS and Bruijn JR (1993). pp 179, 182-183. The Dutch East India Company’s Shipping 1602 – 1795 in a comparative perspective. Ships, sailors and spices: East India Companies and their shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Amsterdam. http://www.vijfeeuwenmigratie.nl/sites/default/files/bronnen/dutcheastindia177-193.pdf} a huge increase of shipping which  had to stop over at the Cape took place between 1600 and 1652, numbering some 1071 European ships on the outward bound journey to the East, and around 700 ships on homeward bound journeys. It was this huge and frequent arrival of ships and people in Table Bay that was the driving force of change. The passengers and seamen included European soldiers and merchant company officials, African and Asian seamen, and African and Asian slaves. Over this entire period before the Dutch VOC colony started at the Cape it is probable that around 150 000 people visited this shoreline frontier of the Camissa Port. Neither the Europeans nor the local population of indigenous people would have been ignorant of each other on the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck as is most often projected by colonial academics, whose own work often betrays the contradictory accounts of engagement.

It seems that Autshumao had another name ^{[76]Elphick R;  Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pp 84 Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).} in his youth as record shows that the English had difficulty getting their tongues around it and used various phonetic versions – Haddah, Adda or Haddot – then finally Harry. Interestingly one of his son’s names was Arre. By the time of Autshumao’s trip abroad the whole issue of maritime travel would have begun to be demystified. The name Autshumao itself seems to have arisen from association between Autshumao and travel on the seas.

On returning from Java the English assisted Autshumao in establishing himself and his community of more than 20 on Robben Island. Within a year Autshumao convinced a Dutch ship to assist him in bringing over another 30 followers. ^{[77]Elphick R;  Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pp 84 Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).} There is a possibility that Autshumao had his own means of going to the mainland and communicating with people there. It is likely that the English provided him with a longboat. Such a view is underscored by Autshumao’s later accompanying the Dutch by boat to Robben Island after van Riebeeck’s occupation of the Cape as well as his later escape from Robben Island when imprisoned there. But even if this was not the case, Elphick notes that the frequent ships that were visiting would take Autshumao’s Robben Island community on visits to relatives on the mainland. These details all militate against the argument as to who Autshumao and his people were – ‖Ammaqua traders or the Van Riebeeck invention of the ‘strandlopers’ stereotype.

Here is a first-hand account about Autshumao (aka Hadda) on Robben Island by Peter Mundy ^{[78]Mundy Peter. Edt Sir Carnac-Temple R (rep 1967). Vol2 p 327. The travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia 1608-1667.} travelling on the English ship Mary:

 “Here the said Hadda with all his kindred and allies, in number about 60 persons, men, women and children. Of the latter there were some so well favoured as it could not be expected in such a place. They came all about us, very merrily rejoicing at our coming, better apparelled then those on the mainland, though after the same manner, Hadda excepted; who that day came in English habit from head to foot. The said Hadda is Chief of all that dwell there and Governor of the Island.”

This description contrasts radically from Jan van Riebeeck’s opinion of Autshumao and his people. What also comes out here is a similar theme that is often repeated by visitors making contact with people associated with the ‖Ammaqua traders – namely the reference “there were some so well favoured as it could not be expected in such a place”. Interestingly, with reference to the Nama dictionary when you break down the components of the name Goringhaiqua (one of the Cape Khoi groups on the Peninsular) to its three parts (!Uri – ‖ae – khoe), it means white – coming together – people. ^{[79]Haacke W H G and Eiseb E (2002). A Khoekhoegowab dictionary with an English-Khoekhoegowab index. Windhoek, Namibia; Gamsberg Macmillan}

With regard to persons of mixed parentage pre-1652, passing scribes, Tavernier like Mundy, and others, make clear references to indigene children who they describe as “white and beautiful”. ^{[80]Tavernier JB Vol2 p 304. edt V Ball and William Crooke 1925. Travels in India / read with- Mundy P. edt Sir Richard Carnac Temple; Vink M (2003). The World’s oldest trade: Dutch Slavery and slave trade in the Indian Ocean in the 17th Century. Journal of World History Rpr (1967). P 327 The travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia 1698 -1667} Van Riebeeck also referred to Oudasoa’s daughter as “a pretty, well-shaped girl, no darker than a fairly white mestizo”. ^{[81]Riebeeck J; Journal of Jan van Riebeeck. As in Liebbrandt HVC – Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope; Vol I; pg 137} It is very clear that the ‖Ammaqua trader community stood out from ‘strandlopers’ and their description by others over a lengthy period differs from Van Riebeeck’s early views in his journal from 1652.

It is recorded that when Autshumao was engaged by a French ship, his authoritative stance and dress resulted in the French listening to him and removing their anchorage to Saldahna Bay. He is recorded as telling the French that he was:

“au service de messejieurs Holandois et de messjeurs less Anglois.” ^{[82]Elphick R;  Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pp 85 Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).}.

Around 1638 Autshumao and his Robben Island community of 60, at their request, were assisted by the English to move back to the mainland where Autshumao established his trading and port servicing community on the banks of the port’s strategic drinking water source – the Camissa River. At this time Knox-Johnston ^{[83]Knox-Johnston R; The Cape of Good Hope – A Maritime History. Hodder and Stoughton. Pg 136; London (1989).} notes:

 “… the Dutch and the English also had their own trusted native who would keep letters and hand them over to the captains of home-going ships. A ship on arriving in the bay would fire a cannon, and this would bring the ‘postman’ down to the beach.  A ship’s boat would be sent to fetch him and he would exchange mail and report any other useful information in exchange for a small reward.”

Such descriptions of activities serve as evidence that the kind of impression that Van Riebeeck in his journal and letters to the VOC, paints about local Khoi people and their relationship to European visitors was inaccurate or intended misleading. They were neither primitive and remote, nor aggressive or antagonistic.

By all accounts Autshumao performed his postmaster, trader and port master roles ably, was a proficient linguist, was shrewd and astute and also knew the value of playing off the English against their enemies, the Dutch and French. The Peninsular Khoi knew to keep their main herds of thousands of cattle and sheep, and their families, far inland away from the Europeans. Autshumao was not simply an opportunist go-between trader but filled a defensive buffer role for his people. In modern maritime language Autshumao offered post and communications, stevedoring, ship’s chandler and trader services.

Lest one think that it was just the English that appraised the local Cape Khoi differently from Jan van Riebeeck. It is also important that we look at a Dutch viewpoint. A previous mention has been made of the wrecking of the Nieuwe Haerlem (1647) and its survivors. Captain Leendert Janzsen, Matthijs Proot and the other leading personalities, used their time at the Cape to gather intelligence. They recorded the flora and fauna; the indigenes and their cattle and sheep herds; the local trading practices and the arrival of vessels; they also began mapping the Peninsula. This was later shared in the Netherlands with Jodocus Hondius III who drafted up a scientific report, which was published. But in addition, Janzsen and Proot produced their own report, the Remonstratie, for the VOC.

What Janzsen and Proot ^{[84]Gijsels Artus (1638). As in Raven- Hart R (1967) Before van Riebeeck: Callers at South Africa from 1488 to 1652. Struik. Cape Town} had to say about the Cape Khoi people and about how relations with them should be conducted was later contradicted by Van Riebeeck. They wrote:

“Others will say that the natives are brutish and cannibals, from whom nothing good is to be expected, and we shall have to be on our guard continually; but this is only a sailors’ yarn … it is not to be denied that they are without laws or government … and it is indeed true, that also some sailors and soldiers have been killed by them; but the reason for this is always left unspoken by our folk, to excuse themselves for having been the cause of it, since we firmly believe that the peasants of this country [Holland], if their cattle were to be shot down and taken off without payment, would not show themselves a whit better than these natives, had they not to fear the law. …since the natives … came daily to the fort (which we had thrown up for our defence) with all friendliness to barter, and brought cattle and sheep in quantities …”

Captain Janzsen and Proot make it quite clear that all instances of altercation are a result of:

 “the uncivilised and ungrateful conduct of our folk”.

It was primarily Autshumao’s community with whom Captain Janzsen interacted, and he would have had a lot of experience because he and his community of 60 shipwreck survivors remained at the Cape for almost one year. But they were not the first large group to remain at Table Bay for a lengthy period.

In 1644 340 men survived the wrecking of the Dutch ship Mauritius Eylant and remained at Table Bay until rescued by the Tijger. The survivors camped at Salt River for four months before being picked up and the numbers of people were more than double Van Riebeeck’s later 1652 settlement party. ^{[85]Callahan Peter (2013). Shipwrecks of the Blaauwberg Coastline part 1. http://treasurehunters.co.za/forums/coins-cachesandother/shipwrecks-of-the-blaauwberg-coastline-part-1/}

How the conflict between Autshumao and Jan van Riebeeck began

While Jan van Riebeeck quickly developed an aggressive and derogatory stance toward the Cape Khoi and toward Autshumao and his traders in particular, the Dutch VOC must squarely shoulder the blame for the conflict. Jan van Riebeeck acted on instruction of the VOC to seize possession of the fresh water supply, the Camissa River, and effectively take over the ‖Ammaqua Watermans settlement area.

Jodocus Hondius ^{[86]Hondius J. (1652) A clear description of the Cape of Good Hope. As in Master S (2012). P4. The first stratigraphic column in South Africa from Hondius (1652) and its correlatives. http://sajs.co.za/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/544-7363-1-PB.pdf} in 1652 describes the Table Bay site and river:

“A short distance beyond the tail of the Lion Mountain is the little Fresh River which is a stream rising in the foothills of Table Mountain, or in its higher slopes. The river usually flows quite strongly, but in most parts the water does not reach above the knees. In the year 1644 the crew of the wrecked ship Mauritius marked out a fort with 4 bastions across this Fresh River in order to protect the fresh water, but no building took place until this present year, 1652, when a fortress was begun on the eastern side of the same streamlet”.

This text refers to Van Riebeeck’s appropriation of the Camissa River and settlement, the exact spot being the current Cape Town city blocks around Lower Plein Street and Adderley Street known as the Golden Acre Centre.  On its lower floor the public can view part of the dam and aqueduct constructed to control the water resource.

This shows how the Camissa was recognised for its strategic importance just as Autshumao had recognised it. The first aggression of the Dutch against Autshumao and his community was the seizure of the river and the land around it. According to Theal ^{[87]Theal G M (1887). P 34. History of South Africa 1486-1691. Swan Sonnenschein & Co. London}, Jan van Riebeeck was given clear instructions by the VOC:

“The skippers were directed to proceed to Table Bay, and to construct close to the fresh water river, a wooden building, the materials for which they were to take with them. They were then to select a suitable site for a fort, to contain space for the accommodation of seventy or eighty men, and to this fort when finished they were to give the name Good Hope.”

In the first eight months after van Riebeeck’s arrival, he built a fort right on top of Autshumao’s settlement, which had hosted him and his men. Van Riebeeck notes that after he had moved into the fort he could see the forlorn Autshumao still encamped by the river on the opposite bank.

The term ‖ammis, gammis, khamma is the root for ‘Camissa’ in the language of the Nama and !Ora. It is also the term for any fresh-water river. The river in Table Bay is noted by the Portuguese as ‘Aguada de Saldanha’ (water of Saldanha – the original Portuguese name for Table Bay) while the Dutch similarly later named this same river the Soetwater Rivieren (Sweetwater) and referred to it in documents as Fresh Water, as distinguished from Zouten Rivieren (Salt River).The Khoena did not have affectionate or honorary names as in the European tradition. Words used were utilitarian and simply descriptive or for verbal route-mapping. Governor-General van Goens in 1682 notes that the inland Khoena refer to the fresh-water river, now known as the Fish River as ‘Camissa’ or ‘Cumissa’. These indigene names pop-up elsewhere, meaning the same thing – fresh water. For example – Tsistsikamma = tse-tsesa + kamma means ‘clear water’, ‘place of much water’ or ‘place where water begins’. The river running through Cape Town, today driven underground, is also known as – ‘Camissa’ meaning place of sweet water. While the Cape Peninsula is referred to as ‖Hui !Caeb (meaning “where the clouds gather”) the port City of Cape Town is known as Camissa – the port that was a new creation where the central role of the port was its water resource as research documentation adequately shows this was the case for both the Europeans and for the Khoi.

If we follow the words of Jan van Riebeeck reading very carefully it is clear that once the Fort de Goede Hoop was almost complete, Jan van Riebeeck separated Autshumao and his family from the rest of the Watermans who were expelled from Table Bay to behind Table Mountain and Lion’s Head where they were divested of their trading and facilitation economy and forced to make a living by hunting and gathering like the Sonqua Fishermen. Autshumao however was first tolerated to remain camped on the opposite bank of the Camissa River, across from the Fort de Goede Hoop. Jan van Riebeeck in an effort to keep him from leading the others in resistance and also using him and his family to gather intelligence then had Autshumao and his family quartered at the Fort de Goede Hoop. Van Riebeeck wrote in his journal ^{[88]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp38-39  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“The Watermen live in this Table Valley and behind the Lion and Table Mountains. Herri remains with us with wife and children to serve as interpreter – his people subsisting behind said mountains on mussels and roots, the latter tasted like skirret and resembling the Japanese nisi but not tasting at all like it; otherwise we would collect a quantity for Batavia, where the nisi is in great demand and fetches good prices.”

Autshumao had complete free movement during his time at the Fort but Jan van Riebeeck recorded his movements and his relationships with other Europeans, especially the English. It is explicit that for instance Autshumao travelled by sea between Table Bay and Hout Bay, and Table Bay to Robben Island with ships or yachts. Autshumao also regularly travelled inland and continued to facilitate trade. Shrewdly he also hindered trade between the Dutch and the Cape Khoi as a fightback against his loss of business. Autshumao further got the Khoi to raise their prices knowing the Dutch would soon run short of the currencies in metals with which they bartered. Van Riebeeck’s suspicion and retaliatory intent is laid bare in his journal ^{[89]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pg 47  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“The Saldanhars…did not show any desire for copper – disinclined to trade. Did not know what to make of it afraid that Herri, formerly an enemy of the Saldanhars, but now very intimate with them, is brewing mischief, which, if discovered, will secure him quarters with wife, children and all the Watermen on Robben Island, to enable us to trade successfully with the Saldanhars and win their favour.”

A non-subjective reading of all available documentation at the time demonstrates that the conflict between Jan van Riebeeck and Autshumao is rooted around the control of the water and the site of settlement as well as contestation around the control of the port operation of trading-supplying and facilitating the international sea traffic moving through the port. It is also around the Dutch perception of Autshumao being friendlier towards the English and specifically being the agent for the English East India Company. The Dutch were in fact very aware that the British had formally annexed the Cape of Good Hop since 1620 and could at any time exercise this claim and that this would lead to war.

Autshumao from the beginning made it clear to the Dutch that they had to work through him to be able to get any favourable trade with the Khoi who controlled the substantial livestock reserves behind the lines of the small colony which at this time was beyond the control of the VOC, without soldier power and cavalry. From the beginning and with increasing intensity Jan van Riebeeck expressed his hostility towards Autshumao and his bargaining and bartering approach and he was able to see through Autshumao’s strategy of ‘containment’ of the Dutch VOC operation at the Cape.

It is in this arena of the conflict between Jan van Riebeeck and the Dutch on the one side and Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) on the other side that colonial researchers so identify with the Europeans that they subjectively adopt his reasoning and approach, and simply see Autshumao through the VOC lens.

The disparaging remarks that demonise Autshumao as a rogue, vagabond, cheat and primitive is all contradicted by Jan van Riebeeck organising wining and dining sessions between the Commander’s family and Autshumao’s family including great consumption of Spanish wine and Dutch cheese and butter. Jan van Riebeeck ^{[90]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp85-86  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} notes that Autshumao in fact loved wearing European clothing too. This links up with the same observation by Mundy 25 years earlier. This is the first glaring clue that all is not well with the dominant narrative regarding Autshumao.

These facts hardly fit the descriptions of Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) as dirty, stinking, scavenging, good-for-nothing ‘strandlopers’. Both the strategic and tactical methods used by Autshumao and discussed by Jan van Riebeeck in his journal over six years indicate a formidable foe with a reasoned approach to his loss of power. Indeed in the first two years Autshumao made himself absolutely indispensable to Jan van Riebeeck, and van Riebeeck operated on the principle of keeping his enemy close to him. Both men were clear about their relationship to the other. Primarily Jan van Riebeeck had no real choice but to use Autshumao’s interpretation and diplomatic services, but quickly latched onto Autshumao’s talented and sharp young niece, Krotoa, as an alternative that he may cultivate to replace Autshumao. Jan van Riebeeck in his journal on numerous occasions expresses what he believes to be ‘treachery’ on Autshumao’s part and spells out an understanding of Autshumao’s containment approach to the VOC operations.

Besides making himself indispensable, Autshumao educated the Khoi about value of their livestock and pricing, urging the Khoi to up their prices and did so in full knowledge of the limited barter currency available to the Europeans. This together with ensuring no direct contact with the Cochoqua and their large herds and with Autshumao positioning himself as a buffer between Jan van Riebeeck and the Khoi peoples who mainly spent summers on the Peninsular, effectively was a containment strategy. ^{[91]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 47-48  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“On 26 November 1652 ….Whilst trading we saw them communicating with Herrie, who seemed to urge them to ask more copper, thus greatly hindering us…. It is evident that Herri instead of good, is doing us harm, and observing his barefaced treachery.”

“On 27 November 1652 ….Barter went on smoothly until Herri came, showing that he is in our way and that some course must be pursued with him.”

This occurred again on 28 November 1652 and it also illustrates the fears and tensions of the Dutch regarding Autshumao’s relationship with the English as their agent. By 21 December 1652 Jan van Riebeeck notes ^{[92]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 53-54  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“the native desire for copper has passed away, as appears from the conduct of a chief to-day, though we offer more. They inquire daily for the ships, especially the English vessels, which makes us suppose that Herri has been influencing them to hold out, as he no doubt likes the English more than he does us, having voyaged with them to Bantam, and expecting to have some profit from them. To prevent which we hope time and opportunity will offer us the means. Would like to have prompt orders to forbid him to trade with the natives or otherwise.”

Eight months after their first arrival, by 23 December 1652 the Dutch food was nearing exhaustion, and no fish was being caught, and little livestock was being sold to Jan van Riebeeck which also resulted in the diminished ability to provide supplies for the ships. The entry for that day in the journal of Jan van Riebeeck is filled with despair. On 24 December 1652 van Riebeeck blamed Autshumao for the poor relations with the Cape Khoi and their reluctance to supply livestock to the Dutch. Jan van Riebeeck says ^{[93]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 54-55 H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“Perhaps prejudiced by Herri, they are afraid of us, and now more so than ever. Herri likes the English more than he does us, being always full of them no doubt he has persuaded the natives to keep their cattle back until the arrival of the English, as he seems to know pretty exactly when their fleet will be here from India….. We doubt whether Herri interprets faithfully, as we often trade better without him – if the English arrive, we will be better able to discover what connection there is between them.”

The American academic Richard Elphick, in “Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa”, like others, looks at the first six years of Jan van Riebeeck’s settlement and engagement very much from the European lens and in so doing gives a prejudicial account and analysis of what effectively is the real first protracted clash or low intensity war – a cold war, between the Dutch and the Khoi, with Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) initially in a very successful resister role. Certainly Autshumao’s approach of cold-war was more productive for the Khoi than the hot war of 1659 – 1660. There is almost a trivialising of the battle of wits, strategies and tactics between the two protagonists, Jan van Riebeeck vs Autshumao, which has the effect of dismissing the relevance of the latter as a ‘primitive’ lone-ranger who was simply an annoyance. Autshumao is criminalised while Jan van Riebeeck is presented in the role of civiliser and developer. Underpinning the dominant accounts is a colonial paradigm of thinking and it is these accounts that have become the narrative in the tourism and heritage arena.

The Shepherd Saga – Autshumao’s increased resistance and the gains achieved

By October 1653 Autshumao realised that he had reached the end of the usefulness of operating within the Fort de Goede Hoop and now had to use all of the intelligence that he had gathered, so that he could re-establish his once thriving business. He also, it would seem, felt that he had played his hand in weakening the Dutch fortunes and had noted that their resources were becoming dangerously depleted. The vulnerability of the Dutch and their dependence on him required a new tactic.

Autshumao supported by his friends among the powerful Cochoqua together with the Goringhaiqua led by Gogosoa moved swiftly to take the VOC herd of cattle and desert the Peninsular leaving the Dutch struggling to survive. But from the beginning the Khoi unity in this action took a bad turn, when first there was a Dutch casualty during the capture of the herd, a shepherd, and then the Goringhaiqua used their greater numbers on the Peninsular to dictate the way forward. The likelihood is that with the weakened Dutch settlement now obvious, the Goringhaiqua did not appreciate the long game of Autshumao and thus the tactic of the raid on the Dutch cattle herd became an end in itself rather than Autshumao’s means toward an end.

On 19 October 1653 after the Sunday religious service it was reported to Jan van Riebeeck that Autshumao had absconded with his family from the Fort de Goede Hoop. Later at dinner van Riebeeck learnt the full story that all of the VOC cattle had also been taken and the shepherd, David Jansz had been killed. Jan van Riebeeck lamented in his journal ^{[94]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 85-86  H.C.V. Leibrandt; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“On 20 October 1653 – Besides we have been cruelly deceived in our interpreter Herri, whom we had always maintained as the chief of the lot, who had always dined at our table as a friend of the house and been dressed in Dutch clothes; besides also that from every fresh arrival he was provided with bags of bread, rice, wine… by way of remunerating him for his services as interpreter. But this difficulty will be overcome if the Saldanhars are not frightened away by this theft of the beach-rangers from coming to us, thinking that we might revenge ourselves on them. Do not hope so. The cows are to be regretted, especially as we had much milk, butter and cheese, as in the Fatherland – all gone at once.”

In one sharp action that hit the Dutch hard in their stomachs and at a point where morale was as low as their meagre resources, a new disadvantageous trajectory proceeded for the Dutch. So hard had they been hit by this move that a Council of Policy meeting decided on 21 October 1653 that ^{[95]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pg 86  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“notwithstanding the theft, and though the men were very bitter in consequence, no harm should be done to the natives, even if the thieves, yea Herri himself, were encountered, not only to show that we only wish to be on friendly terms, but also desire to forgive and forget, in order to remove all fear from the Saldanhars and draw them into close intercourse with us, as the season for trading is now near at hand. Consequently a plakkaat was issued that the men should not be carried away by anger to take vengeance on the natives, but to avoid it as much as possible.”

There actually was no clarity for the Dutch as to whether the murder of the shepherd David Jansz, the theft of the cattle and the absconding of Autshumao and family were all part of the same action, involving all of the same people. The lack of clarity would result in this scenario becoming a cold-case for the next five years. But as a result of a few simple twists of fate in 1658, linked to a rather foolish breakdown in unity, Jan van Riebeeck came to use the cold case to his advantage.

By 23 October 1653 ^{[96]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 86-87  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} having located the whereabouts of Autshumao through acquiring information from his enemies the VOC Council of Policy despatched Corporal Jan van Harwarden with 16 men to check out the information. Van Harwarden located Autshumao’s well-guarded camp near False Bay but Autshumao gave them the slip and by the end of October 1652 the VOC militia were worn out by the chase and could not catch him. This already suggested that the stolen cattle was not with Autshumao and his men. Autshumao had indeed escaped to his Cochoqua allies in Saldahna where one of his nieces was the wife of the Cochoqua leader Oudasoa.

By the end of January 1654 ^{[97]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp175-176  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} there was fear gripping the small colonial settlement with increased guard duty and with the Council of Policy taking action against Khoi at the Fort de Goede Hoop whom they believed to be collaborators of Autshumao. They were accused of assisting him in the theft of the cattle. Jan van Riebeeck needed to take some form of action to boost the morale among the company by making an example of them. In his Journal on 28 January 1654 he was able to show some success in relation to the pursuit of Autshumao, though not his capture. Autshumao’s niece Krotoa was found, along with one of his wives and his children, as well as some of the VOC cattle but they were with the Goringhaiqua and not with the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans). Autshumao years later argued that his family had been taken captive by his enemies the Goringhaiqua who he said were the real beneficiaries of the stolen cattle.

In many entries in his journal Jan van Riebeeck at this stage constantly refers to encounters with (Watermans) ‖Ammaqua and Autshumao’s Cape Khoi allies (Gorachoqua and Cochoqua). All of this suggests that as a result of resistance and outwitting the Dutch, Autshumao had grown in influence with the ‖Ammaqua and among the Cape Khoi in general. When the Dutch began to find their stolen cattle among the Goringhaiqua they then also referred to these as allies of Autshumao, when indeed this was not the case even although initially Autshumao and Gogosoa did co-operate in the act of taking the herd of cattle. In the journal entry on 7 February 1654 Jan van Riebeeck says: ^{[98]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 177-1778  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“Hottentots visited the redoubt at night thinking that there was nobody and intending to steal the iron off the gates….  Detected by the guard they ran away. All are allies of Herri having with them our stolen cattle and Herri’s people. We suffer so much annoyance from them that it is becoming unbearable. Not strange therefore if this lot were disposed of not killing them but taking their cattle and using them as slaves to work on the islands for seal catching…..  would then be able to get on nicely with the rest who are very simple minded.”

By this time in Jan van Riebeeck’s mind all of his troubles were the fault of Autshumao who had in his opinion now gotten control over all the Cape Khoi – Gorachoqua and Goringhaiqua. There was no real evidence of such widespread support for Autshumao and Jan van Riebeeck still did not understand the strengths of the Goringhaiqua nor the indigenous people as a whole on the Cape Peninsular.

Autshumao too, was not having everything going his own way because in retreating further up the West Coast to his Cochoqua allies he was open to attack from his enemies the Sonqua fishermen. Jan van Riebeeck heard word from his men that Autshumao’s allies were raided of livestock by the Sonqua fishermen.

Entries in Jan van Riebeeck’s journal over March and April 1654 suggest that the Watermans were still assisting European vessels and possibly are also far inland and up to Saldahna Bay. This ties into Valentijn’s map a few decades later showing the names of both Goringhaicona and in particular ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) in the area far away from Table Bay in Cochoqua territory. These accounts however do suggest that rather than having shrunk, the Watermans had grown in strength and influence.

From July 1654 it becomes apparent as to what Autshumao’s strategy had developed into. Various groups of people were now turning up regularly at the Fort de Goede Hoop and are described by Jan van Riebeeck as Autshumao’s allies. They demand direct access to the ships arriving in Table Bay as they wish to do business with these ships. Clearly under the influence of Authshumao there was an attempt to exploit the weakness of Jan van Riebeeck and his colonial settlement, which could not assist the ships needs on their own. Autshumao had again levelled the playing field. A number of entries in van Riebeeck’s journal illustrate Autshumao’s tactics using allies to engage, taunt and exploit the Dutch weaknesses. ^{[99]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp195-205  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“On 10 July 1654 … Some of Herri’s allies arrive with 4 meagre head of cattle, could not come to a sale. Wished to go on board to fill their bags and stomachs with bread and wine; but as they had often played us the trick to walk off with their cattle after their return from the ships, we told them that we would treat them well on board if they sold their cattle. Left with their cattle, whether they will return, time will show. Will continually place before their eyes, samples of the copper, tobacco and beads, brought by this vessel, as soon as landed. Some of our people, sent for wood and sorrel, were molested by the Hottentots and forbidden to gather any; in short they are getting more audacious every day; will soon have to show our teeth, but must wait until they are here with thousands of cattle; in the meanwhile we must strengthen their self-conceit not only to find a better opportunity to revenge the murdered Christian blood, but to repay ourselves for the stolen cattle.”

“On 18 July 1654… bartered 5 cows from Herri’s allies for a higher price than ordinary to draw them on; allowed some to proceed on board, requested the skipper to treat them well with bread, rice, arrack or wine to make them inclined to bring more cattle…”

“On 6 August 1654 ….Woodmen report that Herri’s allies were on the side of Salt River with their cattle; some brought us a tusk which we bought, told us to come to-morrow with copper and tobacco to them: would like to trade with us.”

“On 18 September 1654 …. The ‘Roode Vos’ being despatched to Saldanha Bay to see whether any natives might be met there, from whom cattle might be obtained. Can get nothing from Herri’s allies. Vessel leaves.

23 Novenber 1654…. . Some new Hottentots arrive with 3 beasts, accompanied by some of Herri’s allies, who influenced them to such an extent that it was difficult to trade with them.

Between 27 and 28 November 1654 …. Obtained two more beasts – Herri’s allies present; appear to act as brokers – not profitable to the Company. These rascals are daily among and insult us.

By 10 February 1655 Van Riebeeck’s journal ^{[100]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp214  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} indicates great introspection on his part. He is still smarting from the incident of the killing of the shepherd and theft of cattle in 1653. He again identifies all of his troubles with Autshumao’s possible handiwork. Autshumao had by this time become almost spectral, legendary.

“…will henceforth have to take more care, as the theft of the cattle was the result of too great confidence on our part. (The Cape Khoi ) are getting so bold that we must hold the tools in one hand and arms in the other, or at least have soldiers everywhere to avoid their molestations. Last night some 50 of them wished to build their huts near the side of the canal of the fortress, and being told to do so a little further off, stoutly declared that it was their land, and would build where they liked, and if we would not allow it, they would come in numbers and kill us, showing that they could easily scale the walls and knew how to break the palisades. Evident that the rogues get worse by kind treatment.”

“What Herri does inland to the prejudice of the Company it is difficult to say; it cannot be any good he is doing; will have to take care that we are not suddenly attacked. The fort will not easily be taken, but as all the men have their hands full, and hardly one has been spared to keep a separate watch, a large slaughter may take place among us. Have therefore divided the men into three watches, to watch every third night, fully armed, and nevertheless to do their work during the day; some to remain at the gate and examine all the bushes round about to see whether no Hottentots are hiding in them, that those at work may not be surprised, of which we are more and more growing afraid.”

Between March 1655 and June 1655 the entries in Jan van Riebeeck’s journal further illustrate the thinking behind Autshumao’s cold-war against the Dutch. Autshumao seemed to have successfully won a hearts-and-minds battle among the various Cape Khoi groups. These had grown bold as they saw the success of Autshumao’s approach and the discomfort of Jan van Riebeeck. Autshumao himself had become a ghost of a character at times said to be far inland or in Saldahna and at other times said to be just a couple of kilometres away beyond the Salt River. The entry of Jan van Riebeeck in his journal on 7 April 1955 says ^{[101] Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pg219  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“Went a little inland with the Hon. Sterthenius to have a look at the Hottentot encampments, four in number, having amongst them about 1,200 sheep and 400 head of cattle: all Herri’s allies, who would not sell us a single animal, and when we returned from the forest which we had also gone to see, and to inspect the position of certain ground for cultivation, they offered us a sickly lamb, which we refused, telling them to bring other sheep which we would buy for copper, which they were not inclined to do. They were not at all afraid of us though we appeared with 50 or 60 soldiers…”

Autshumao’s cold-war ends with re-engagement with Jan van Riebeeck

Suddenly Autshumao changed the course of his approach over the previous two years and with a show of strength much more powerful than when he left the Fort in 1653 turned up at the Fort and began discussions with Jan van Riebeeck. Here van Riebeeck reports on the engagement in his journal ^{[102]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 225-226  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} :

“On 23 June 1655 ….beyond all expectations the interpreter Herri, with 50 armed men, strangers, and a lot of 40 fine cows, of which, through him, we obtained 26, after his request to see the Commander. This having been allowed, and having been well treated, he commenced to apologise for leaving in October, 1653, when all the cattle were stolen, stating that the theft had not been committed by him or with his sanction, but by the Cape men (called by us his allies, and at present living under our protection); that the boy had been murdered by the son of the fat old man now the captain of the gang;

…..had left through fear that he would be hanged, as we might think that he was guilty, and to show his innocence and good feeling he had now returned with these real Saldanhars and their cattle to sell them to us, with the promise that he would obtain for us from them and from others as many animals as we wished…. only wished to be forgiven and favourably received. Granted provisionally, and 25 lbs wire, copper plate, tobacco, wine, pipes, a bag of rice, bread…. given him to make merry with his comrades….. and well knowing our good disposition, he had come with these Saldanhars, assuring us that the others would be well pleased…. Assured him of our forgiveness and protection, allowing him as before to eat at the Commander’s table.”

And so began a new era for Autshumao who seemed to accept that all had been fixed between himself and the Dutch and that he would now be able to settle down to a new and prosperous life. He was totally unaware that the cold-case of the 1653 murder of the shepherd and the theft of the cattle had not really been set aside by Jan van Riebeeck.

By the beginning of 1656 Autshumao had decreased his interpreting services for the Dutch, but continued facilitating and trading with the visiting European ships. He had successfully gained back what he had worked so hard to build since 1630 – a lifetime of hard work. Although he no longer controlled the strategic water supply he was also now a very successful wealthy livestock farmer and an important figure at the Table Bay port.

On 12 December 1655 the regained assured stature of Autshumao is demonstrated in the journal of Jan van Riebeeck ^{[103]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp 251  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“Arrival of English ship, Jan Anthamis or Jan Baptist of 200 tons, Captain Thomas Poth, and merchant Nathaniel Davidts; on board; 24th April, from London and going to Bantam; had touched at Cape Verde, which it left on the 24th August: had lost in the long voyage of 8 months to this 10 men, and still had about 40 sick on board; requested to have refreshments and water; kindly allowed to take a lot of vegetables on board; also gave them 2 cows and 3 or 4 sheep, and allowed 10 or 12 of their sick into our hospital; were very grateful, and dined with the Commander, who bade them welcome. ….. Natives tell us that Herri is not inclined to serve as interpreter, but when ships arrive he is ready to fill his bags with bread, rice and wine; his copper had not been stolen, but he had exchanged it for cattle and sheep, so that he also had become a great Captain and asked very little after us, which we will discover more every day.”

It is at this time that the central character in the later resurrection of the cold-case first appears in the Dutch Commander’s journal. While there is not much in primary documentation about the character Doman, who seems to suddenly appear on the scene only in mid-1658 there actually is a piece of information that everyone overlooked earlier in Jan van Riebeeck’s journal. Various researchers also have put forward why they think this man got the name Doman, speculating with no facts at hand that it may mean ‘dominee’ – a pastor. But Jan van Riebeeck makes it clear why they called him Doman. The Commander’s journal indicates that he is named ‘Dom man’ because he is such a simple-minded man. It is a facetious name with the emphasis on ‘Dom’ – Dumb. Also it would seem that there is no mystery as to who was the patron that sent Doman away to Batavia. Already 3 years before the cold-case confrontation between Jan van Riebeeck and Autshumao, the Commander had been told by informers – Doman and Claes Das, that Autshumao and his ‘gang’ had killed the shepherd and stolen the VOC cattle and they offered to assist Jan van Riebeeck to get to the truth. Jan van Riebeeck clearly protected and sponsored the informer. Van Riebeeck says:^{[104]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp251  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“….A certain Hottentot called by us Doman, or Domine because he was such a very simple-minded man, and Claes Das having been asked by us whether this was true (about Herrie), affirmed it, adding that it was he (Herri) who had stolen the Company’s cattle 2 years ago, and that his sons had murdered the Dutch boy, telling us also how the whole was managed…”

In his journal Jan van Riebeeck expresses an awareness that the copper currency that the VOC had entrusted to Autshumao for the purchase of livestock was only partially used to the VOC’s benefit. Autshumao had in fact appropriated this copper and used it to purchase livestock for himself. He effectively had engaged in compensating himself for his losses at the hands of the VOC. In this manner he was able to fairly quickly build up his wealth in livestock. At this stage because of their own weaknesses the Dutch were not able to challenge Autshumao.

While the overt cold-war had ended to Autshumao’s advantage, Jan van Riebeeck was not taking it laying down that Autshumao had beaten him at his own game. Jan van Riebeeck also suspected that Autshumao had not finished his trajectory of resistance. He notes in his journal on 12 January 1656 that Autshumao was acting in a manner and asking questions that suggested he was planning some kind of renewed mischief or assault ^{[105]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Vol II pp.2-3.  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“Herri took careful notes of the walls of the fort and the cattle kraals; he was allowed to do so, but carefully watched.”

Jan van Riebeeck ordered scouts to follow and spy on Autshumao and the information that he received from them was that Autshumao’s men had increased in number and that he and his men shared camp facilities with the leaders of the other Cape Khoi and their families and that Autshumao had increased his livestock numbers considerably. Van Riebeeck says:^{[106]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part II;.pp2-3;  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“all this the rascal procured with the copper of the Company, which he pretended he had been robbed of….”

On 13 May 1656 in his journal, Jan van Riebeeck ^{[107]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part II; 18-19   H.C.V. Leibrandt.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} dropped his previous pretence about Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua Watermans and Cape Khoi being stupid and dirty wild savages by clearly appraising them differently as formidable foes:

“He is a sly rogue and must be carefully looked after. It won’t do to say they are merely wild savages, what can they do? For the more they are known, the more impertinent they are found to be, and certainly not so savage and stupid as beasts. They will seize their chance whenever it offers, whilst their daily intercourse with the Dutch makes them sharper every day.”

Van Riebeeck ^{[108]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part II;  pp.26-27  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} also dropped all pretence that the Dutch are just interested in peaceful co-existence and made a clear statement on seizure of their land:

“the Caapmen and Herri, with their cattle, passed the fort intending to squat within cannon range, but they were kindly told to go further behind the hill, as we were in want of the grass about here. Herri maintained that the land of the Cape belonged to him and the Capemen, but was told that we also required pastures for our cattle, but if, like the other natives, they also would sell us cattle, we would readily allow them here, but if not, then we cared very little about them and preferred other people in our neighbourhood, as our chief object was to obtain cattle.”

“we added that we considered them the chief impediments in gaining that object. Herri replied that he always did his best to bring the other tribes to us…. so that he deserved to be allowed to squat under the guns of the fort, with all his friends, namely the Caapmen and the black Captain. He was told that permission would be granted if we saw the result of his efforts, and that his claim to the ownership of the Cape lands could not be entertained by the Company, which had taken possession of them for its own purposes.”

By the 22 May 1656 Jan van Riebeeck was again complaining as the Cape Khoi began their return journey to the West Coast as the wet season approached. He complained that ^{[109]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part II; pp.19-20  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}:

“though they are rich in cattle, and only act as brokers between ourselves and the other natives, from whom they manage to obtain a good share of copper and tobacco, to the great injury of the traffic. In this Herri takes the lead, gradually enriching himself and rising to the rank of chief captain, as appears from his cattle feeding behind the Lion Mountain.”  

What had happened was that Autshumao had not only outwitted the Dutch, but had also restituted himself to compensate himself for the injustice committed by the Dutch in seizing his port operation, by becoming a wealthy and powerful independent livestock farmer right under their nose. Furthermore he had once more assumed port authority with visiting ships.

From June 1656 acts of aggression and counter aggression increased with the Khoi stealing chains and a plough from the VOC blacksmith’s shop. The Dutch retaliated by seizing three of the Khoi cattle. This resulted in negotiations with Autshumao who came out of the negotiations with a favourable result that allowed him to remain near the fort. This agreement also was a contract whereby for every large ship arriving he sold the VOC ten head of cattle, and for every yacht or small ship five head of cattle. It was further agreed that Autshumao would be well paid in metals while he would further regularly supply an ox for slaughter and one sheep for Jan van Riebeeck. In return for this new arrangement Autshumao was expected to uphold the orderly behaviour of the Cape Khoi.

Autshumao had thus brought the Dutch to a position whereby they had a respectable business relationship. By 1657 Autshumao, now with a kraal behind Lion’s Head Mountain had almost 500 head of livestock and was a respected figure among many of the Cape Khoi including the Cochoqua, the most numerous, wealthy and powerful Khoi that surrounded the Cape Peninsular and extended deep inland, and with whom Autshumao had familial linkages. However Autshumao also had enemies among the Goringhaiqua Peninsular Khoi, who were envious as to how he had become so successful. Three events would shatter his new found peace.

The betrayal of Autshumao and his imprisonment on Robben Island

In writing this story of Autshumao the literature, both academic and more commercial accounts, including that of Richard Elphick, is most unjust and astoundingly warped at times to the extent that there are so many unsubstantiated versions as to why and how Autshumao was imprisoned on Robben Island.

The actual account in the journal of Jan van Riebeeck ^{[110]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part I; pp  H.C.V. Leibrandt; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} is the only account that we have as to how and why Autshumao was incarcerated on Robben Island. It is a reasonably detailed and straightforward story and nothing like the fanciful and even wrongly dated story as can be seen in many shorthand accounts and it is also certainly not as Elphick suggests that Autshumao’s fate in mid-1658  was – “For reasons that are obscure”. ^{[111]Elphick R; The Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa; pg 105;  Raven Press; Johannesburg (1985).}

Flowing from Elphick’s accounts of the three interpreters there has been much modern day maligning of Krotoa and Autshumao and an overblown heroism projected about Doman (Nommoa) as simply being a freedom-fighter but whose life is very short on detail. The only actual recorded story offers a different interpretation from Elphick’s perspective.

This is not to say that the stories of Autshumao and Krotoa are that of highly conscious political leaders, but certainly they do stand out as exceptional people of their time, with some political consciousness and who gave the Dutch more than just a little bit of a fight. While the rise and fall of Doman traversed only 20 months filled with controversy, Autshumao and Krotoa present two complete lifetimes that through the records of many different voices, offers us the best picture of pre-colonial and post-colonial individual responses to the emergence of the Cape Town as a port that grew into a European colony.

By 1657 all seemed to be going well for Autshumao, but then in February 1657 Jan van Riebeeck took a step in an unexpected direction which immediately threatened the stability he had found. The VOC Commander released a group of VOC officials and granted them plots of land as Free Burghers and effectively set in motion the expansion of a Fort settlement into a full blown colony settlement.  Autshumao was one of the first to protest to Jan van Riebeeck, followed by Gogosoa of the Goringhaiqua (aka Fat Captain). Jan van Riebeeck immediately sought to thwart any possibility of an alliance between the two men who had up until then not been well disposed to each other.

What Autshumao did not seem to realise was that the ambitious new interpreter Doman was blind-siding him in that he had cultivated an excellent relationship with Gogosoa and his son Osingkhimma (aka Schacher). Doman used his relationship with Jan van Riebeeck as interpreter, in turn, to his own advantage. He also saw that Krotoa was close to her family with the ‖Ammaqua and also with their allies the Cochoqua. He was aware that Jan van Riebeeck had brought him into the work of interpretation because the VOC Commander suspected Krotoa was favouring her people in her translation work. Doman responded to these factors by building a relationship with the Goringhaiqua and took an aggressive stance toward Krotoa by painting her as a lackey of the Dutch. He also constantly agitated that the Dutch should kill Autshumao.

Faced with the perceived unity and challenge by Cape Khoi across the board to his development plans, Jan van Riebeeck assisted by the influential visiting Commissioner Rykloff van Goens began to seek radical solutions for what they saw as the Peninsular Khoi problem. Two solutions in particular involved mass forced removals of Khoi. One solution was to drive all the Khoi into Hout Bay and create a fortified valley where the Khoi would be forced to rear cattle for the Dutch. The other radical solution was to dig a canal across from False Bay to Table Bay, expel the Khoi and fortify the Dutch colony. The VOC Directors Seventeen rejected both of these wild and expensive ideas. Instead, an almond hedge and a series of watchtowers were established to control further movements of the Cape Khoi that threatened the new settlers. But in the midst of this Jan van Riebeeck gained assistance in breaking up any possibility of unity between the Cape Khoi with Autshumao as leader from a most unlikely quarter.

The second major event ^{[112]Schoeman K.; Early Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope 1652-1717; Protea Book House. Pretoria. (2007).} was the arrival of two ships with large numbers of African slaves from Angola and from Guinea which vastly increased the number of slaves in the small colony (402 West African slaves). Both the VOC and Free Burghers now possessed slaves to do the back-breaking work. Up until this point there had only been around 15 slaves at the Cape. But from 1658 very quickly the slaves became the largest of the three groups at the settlement – Europeans, Free Blacks and Slaves. In the full period of slavery 1652 – 1870 around 78 000 first generation slaves were brought to the Cape from Africa and Asia and their children and successive generations of grandchildren all became slaves too. Formally slaves were emancipated in 1834, effective from 1838, but continued to be brought to the Cape as ‘Prize Slaves’ until the 1860s. Only after 1870 were all of the compulsory apprenticeships for ‘Prize Slaves’ also known as ‘Liberated Africans’ completed. On 3 June 1658 seven Angolan slaves ran away and on 18 June 1658 another four slaves from Guinea ran away. This led to a hostage-taking drama, where the Dutch VOC under Jan van Riebeeck took three Goringhaiqua leaders as hostages to force the Khoi to return the slaves whom the Dutch believed were being assisted by the Khoi.

In March 1658 the third event ^{[113]Elphick R; Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa. Pg 107; Raven Press. Johannesburg (1985).} had come into play with the return of Doman (also known as Nommoa) from training in Batavia with the Dutch. Doman was a hitherto relatively unknown character who on his return developed a strong relationship with the Goringhaiqua and Gorachoqua. He was also ambitious to establish himself as both prime interpreter for the Dutch and as a leader of a united Cape Khoi formation. Soon after his return from Batavia, Doman entered the service of Jan van Riebeeck as a new interpreter at the Fort. Elphick without any research documentation to back his story simply created a storyline about Doman which has entered the dominant narrative as though the man had the characteristics attributed to him, and in so doing the account given creates a fictional storyline. Neither Elphick nor Schoemann ^{[114]Schoemann K; Seven Khoi Lives – Cape Biographies of the seventeenth century; pp 43-77; Protea; Cape Town; (2009).} who made an attempt to produce a biography for Doman are able to come up with any substantial hard information on Doman.

The Dutch expected and compelled all of the Khoi groups including Autshumao and his people to assist in tracking down the escaped slaves. But Jan van Riebeeck who was already cultivating antagonism between the Goringhaiqua and Autshumao and his ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) also specifically put pressure on the Goringhaiqua to find the escaped slaves, suspecting that they were directly involved in assisting the slaves. Krotoa who was aware of the Commander’s suspicions and aware that Doman was attempting to get rid of her and her uncle Autshumao then played the card of suggesting to the Commander that he detain the leaders of the Goringhaiqua to pressure a return of the slaves. She was motivated by her suspicions about Doman’s intention of undermining and replacing Autshumao as supremo on the Cape Peninsular. She was also motivated by the fact that when she travelled to see her sister, wife of the Cochoqua Chief Oudasoa, the Goringhaiqua attacked her and robbed her along the way. Doman countered Krotoa’s tactic by casting suspicion on Autshumao and his people that they may have assisted or hidden the slaves. He demanded that one of Autshumao’s sons also be detained and this was done.

The seizing of Gogosoa’s sons Schacher and Otegno (and later Jan Cou) did result in some of the slaves being returned but it also backfired for Krotoa when Doman called for Autshumao’s arrest. Doman countered Krotoa’s tactic by casting suspicion on Autshumao and his people that they may have assisted or hidden the slaves when he demanded that Autshumao was also detained during the hostage drama at the Fort de Goede Hoop. Autshumao was lured to the Fort over the issue of the runaway slaves and then he was suddenly presented with the matter of the cold-case of 1653.

Within four months and in the middle of the events involving the escaped slaves Doman had set himself and the Goringhaiqua on a collision course with Autshumao and his ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) on the one hand, and against Krotoa and her perceived links with the Cochoqua, where her sister was married to the Chief Oudasoa.  Both groups had mutual antagonisms with the Goringhaiqua. In all of this Doman played all of the protagonists against each other to produce a perfect scenario for himself as both the VOC Commander and the Chief of the Goringhaiqua would be absolutely dependent on his services.

As has already been shown, two years earlier Doman and Jan van Riebeeck were already plotting Autshumao’s downfall based on the cold-case of 1653, but were simply awaiting an opportune moment. The hostage scenario presented the opportunity that they had been waiting for over some time. Knowing that Jan van Riebeeck wanted to nail Autshumao, Doman, sought to win favour with van Riebeeck by bringing into play negotiations of a peace-treaty with the Goringhaiqua. Doman weaved this into the hasty enquiry to suddenly resolve the five year old murder of shepherd David Jansz and theft of the company cattle at that time. Doman knew that the Goringhaiqua were suspected by van Riebeeck of having a hand in the Shepherd Affair of 1653, and that there had always been tension between the Goringhaiqua and Autshumao who needed to be out of the way for both Jan van Riebeeck and the Goringhaiqua to talk favourable terms. By manipulation of this scenario Doman’s goal was to come out in a supremo position with the Dutch and the Goringhaiqua.

Though Krotoa, Autshumao’s niece, protested to Van Riebeeck that Doman was being mischievous and had no experience of the complicated scenario of the past which involved both the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) and the Goringhaiqua equally, Jan van Riebeeck bought into Doman’s story to some degree and added a few machinations of his own into the mix when realising how this could advantage the VOC. Having lured all of the Khoi leaders into the Fort for discussions around the escaped-slaves scenario, Jan van Riebeeck utilised the situation to deal with all of his problems up until this point.

It was Doman who instigated the totally different discussion on the five year old cold-case murder of the shepherd and the theft of the cattle. Urged on by Doman the Goringhaiqua demanded that for a successful peace they wanted to be exonerated of all charges that they had anything to do with those events and said that Autshumao and his people were solely responsible.

Autshumao realising the difficult situation that had arisen for him protested that both the Goringhaiqua and he and his ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) were involved and maintained that the story that he had given the VOC Commander on his return in June 1655 was true and correct. Krotoa then to protect her uncle identified the assailants who actually killed the shepherd as being her cousin Jan Cou (Khamy) and Boubo It also later transpired that a third party, Ngonnema (the Black Captain) leader of a strong clan among the Cochoqua, was part of those who stole the cattle. Her uncle, she argued, fled because he was afraid of being held to blame. By reading through all of the entries in the Van Riebeeck journal one can give credibility to this version of events with regards to this cold case. Krotoa’s argument was premised on a belief that if she offered such clarity it would avoid the isolation and pinning of the blame exclusively on Autshumao.

Both Autshumoa and Krotoa pointed out that all of the stolen livestock was actually found with the Goringhaiqua and that Autshumao’s own family and some followers were found as hostages with the Goringhaiqua at the time while he had to rebuild his life with the help of the Cochoqua. Indeed as a result of finding Krotoa with the Goringhaiqua Jan van Riebeeck brought her back to the Fort. But Doman stepped in and argued that Krotoa was not telling the truth because he could testify that Autshumao was the first to hit a blow at David Jansz, the shepherd. Doman together with the Goringhaiqua leaders built up the case against Autshumao and two others – Khamy alias Jan Cou, and Boubo, alias Simon, and testified to Jan van Riebeeck and the Council of Policy at the Fort as to their guilt and demanded punishment and the seizing of Autshumao’s wealth.

The account of the re-opening of the cold-case regarding the theft five years earlier of the Dutch VOC cattle herd and the killing of David Jansz is covered in detail over fifteen pages in Jan van Riebeeck’s journal from 21 June 1658 until 10^th July 1658, and thus there is no excuse for the shoddy treatment by most writers about this key event in the life of Autshumao and the affairs of the Dutch VOC. The hostilities towards Autshumao trace back to a confrontation between Krotoa and Doman recorded on 21 June 1658.  It is clear that Doman has made alliances with the Goringhaiqua at the expense of Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua and this prompted Jan van Riebeeck to personally go after Autshumao who had not been to the Fort for some time.

When we look at this entire scenario from a perspective of the overview of this key event, while overtly making show of motivating the Khoi to help in the search of the escaped slaves, the Commander’s journal is clear that from this point they were looking to capture key Khoi leaders to make an example of those who did not respect Dutch authority. On 22 June 1658 evidence was led that accused some of the Khoi women conniving with the slaves that had escaped and therefore some of the Goringhaiqua leaders should be kept as hostages until the slaves were returned. Doman angrily attacked Krotoa suggesting that the Commander was acting on misinformation from her and that Jan van Riebeeck should rather turn his attention to Autshumao and take one of his people as a hostage. Doman also accused Autshumao and his men of recently stealing 14 sheep from the Dutch.

From this overview it becomes very clear that both Krotoa and Doman, are partisan and have aligned themselves, in Krotoa’s case to the alliance of Cochoqua, Gorachoqua and ‖Ammaqua and in Doman’s case to the Goringhaiqua. Initially after first having a huge fight among themselves the three interpreters agreed to defuse some of the tension by telling the Dutch not to take hostages from one group of Peninsular Khoi only but to take someone from each group instead. But Doman shortly after this point was intent on betraying Autshumao and delivering him for punishment or death to the Dutch. ^{[115]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part 2; pp130-133  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} Doman put the following suggestion to Jan van Riebeeck and the VOC Council of Policy:

“In his presence Doman requested the Commander, in the name of the fat Captain of the Caapmen (Goringhaiqua), Gogosoa, that as it was impossible to recapture the rest of the slaves, Schacher should be released, and that Herri should take his place. That Herrie’s cattle should be taken from him, which, after all, he had obtained from the Chainouquas with our copper, bringing only 10 to the fort. He also had the boy killed five years ago by Jan Cou, already a prisoner, and Boubo, who is still with him, and after that carried off all our cattle. Jan Cou had also stolen the last 15 sheep, which are now remaining in Herri’s troop. What the latter possessed was therefore the Company’s property. Personally he was but a poor wretch, and merely chief of the watermen or beach-rangers here…… (only the Gorachoqua, Goringhaiqua and Ankaisoa) who lived round about here, to whom alone the Cape land belonged, and what they might decide upon, the rest would be satisfied with, if Herri only could be put out of the way.”

On Doman’s suggestion the Dutch agreed to release Schacher and the Goringhaiqua hostages, make a peace treaty with them that was favourable to the VOC and, resolved to seize Autshumao for trial and to confiscate all of his livestock as per Doman’s demand on behalf of the Goringhaiqua: ^{[116]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part 2; pg 133  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“….on condition that Herri and all his cattle should be seized, and also his people, he being the first cause of all the mischief, of the theft of the cattle and the murder of the Dutch boy David, stealing continually whenever he found an opportunity …. to get Herri into the Fort by means of sweet palaver, there to seize and bring him face to face with the others, when they will be able to speak against each other and so reveal everything. Further that as soon as he is captured, his cattle shall be seized (now grazing at Salt River) by the sergeant and some soldiers,” — (Signed) Riebeeck,  Bastincq, Claas F, Bordingh (skipper of the Maria), de Man, J. v, Harwaraen and Abraham Gabbema, Secretary.”

“Within an hour the sergeant succeeded in getting Herri inside the fort….. All this having been done, Schacher, assisted by the interpreter Doman, was brought into the Commander’s office and before the Council, assisted by the Hon. Bastincq, he was asked whether he adhered to everything which he had charged Herri with, and would dare to repeat it. He was also informed that Herri had brought the same charges against him, and that the Council wished to know who was sincere and who was not. Schacher himself said as much as he could, and more through Doman…. Thereupon the latter (Herri) was brought in, assisted by Eva…”

Eva in defence of Autshumao made the following case: ^{[117]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part 2; pp135-137  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“They (Gogosoa and Schacher) are as great thieves and rogues as Herri’s people. As soon as anything had been stolen, it was but a mutual act, and both sides divided the booty. To lay all the blame on Herri alone was certainly not right. These were Eva’s own words, spoken by her in Dutch. She added “the murderer of David is Claas, a Hottentot of Herri’s company, who has gone out of the way.”

Doman’s mischief towards Autshumao is laid bare by the following statement in the Commander’s journal: ^{[118]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part 2; pg138  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“A little while after, when Herri and the others had been locked up again, the Commander went outside, and Doman coming to him asked why we had not at once killed Herri. He was told that if they wished to do it they had a good, opportunity, he being locked up with them in one room.”

As a follow up, Doman assisted the leadership of the Goringhaiqua to come as a large group together with the VOC Council of Policy and draw up a treaty: ^{[119]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part 2; pp139-143  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).}

“Together they begged urgently that a proper and permanent treaty might be established between themselves and the Hollanders and that all previous disputes might be settled. They protested that they would rather be killed in the fort than leave without having concluded a proper peace; every one of them offering his head to be cut off for that purpose…..(We)Resolved to enter upon peace negotiations; but to keep them on good terms and cause no suspicion that we mistrust them at all, we decided not to stipulate that hostages should be continually held by us, as they had come to us voluntarily to beg and pray for peace.”

This immediately put Doman in a favourable light with the Goringhaiqua as the VOC decided that any harm done to them in the past by the Goringhaqua and Gorachoqua would be expunged in the spirit of forgive and forget; that the VOC would deal with the issue of the dead shepherd with Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua as they were to blame; that in future any wrongdoing against the Europeans would be dealt with by the Goringhaiqua punishing Khoi offenders; that the Goringhaiqua and Gorachoqua accepted that they would be permanently restricted to the eastern side of the Salt River and Liesbeeck River and only come to the other side when requiring protection of the VOC when under attack; that none of their cattle and sheep would be allowed on the Dutch side of the rivers or on the free-burgher farms; should livestock trespass the Europeans had right to shoot them; that when any slaves or company servants desert, the Peninsular Khoi would capture the fugitives and hand them over to the Fort and that the VOC would pay them for this service; that they shall stop the Dutch-containment practices hindering the VOC from trading with the Cochoqua so that the Dutch have more access to the rich cattle herds that were far away; that the Peninsular Khoi would guarantee every large ship arriving in Table Bay a supply of 10 oxen and 10 sheep for copper and tobacco and every yacht and flute with 5; and will also supply the fort with 2 oxen every Sunday for the garrison, and with 2 sheep for the Commander and officers; and one of the Goringhaiqua would be allowed to board each ship to barter.

It was a disastrous peace treaty whereby Doman had actually delivered the Peninsula Khoi into the hands of the colonialists simply to edge himself into a supremo position. Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua traders who had been relatively successful in their containment of the Dutch were sold out. Indeed the Dutch passed a resolution that all of Autshumao’s ‖Ammaqua followers would henceforth be subjects of the Goringhaiqua.

When the VOC Council of Policy took a resolution that Doman and the Goringhaiqua version was the truth and that Autshumao and the other two were to be incarcerated on Robben Island for life as a sentence for their crimes, and that the VOC would take all of Autshumao’s livestock in repayment for the crimes of 1653, the seal was set on the fate of the Khoi in future years.

The Council also resolved that Doman should be instructed to tell Gogasoa and his son Osinghkimma alias Schacher that they would receive the chieftainship over all of Herri’s ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) who would henceforth be their subjects. At this stage van Riebeeck thought that Autshumao only had 9 or 10 fighting men still loyal to him. On 10^th July 1658 Jan van Riebeeck^{[120]Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part 2; pp145  H.C.V. Leibrandt; p.; Cape Town; W. A. Richards & Sons: (1897).} noted in his journal with some triumphal sarcasm about the adversary who had for so long gotten the better of him:

“The ex-interpreter or as the English used to call him, King Harry, was removed in the sheep’s boat out of his kingdom at this furthest corner of Africa to Robben Island, with his comrades Jan Cou…. and Boubo, alias Simon….. As soon as Herri had been placed on the Island, peace is to be offered to his followers and the Watermans that we may be clear of all enemies…..“

And thus through an act of betrayal and connivance the old man with such a long history of innovation, courage, skill and largely wise and passive resistance was stripped of his bountiful herds of sheep and cattle, and incarcerated effectively as a political prisoner on Robben Island. The removal of Autshumao did not bring the expected peace for the Dutch, and ultimately it did not bring victory to the Peninsular Khoi. Had Autshumao held on to his new status just a little longer, together with the other wealthy independent Khoi farmers like Ankaisoa and allied with the strategic Oudasoa of the Cochoqua the entire history of the Khoi relationship with the Dutch may have taken a different course. As it was, the old European strategy of ‘Divide and Rule’ won the day at the Cape within the next decade.

The Journal contains much more detail of the treachery against Autshumao by Doman which should be read in full to dispel claims by some writers of ambiguity. The result of Doman’s delivery of the Peninsula Khoi, their lands and their cattle into the hands of the Dutch was the ultimate measure of control that had been seized by the Dutch. Doman’s turn-around to taking leadership in the war a year later has somehow obscured the fact that it was he who facilitated the conditions that led to the war. Only after the war was over did the Khoi realise how Doman had failed them and once more Autshumao was given the respect that he deserved. Autshumao’s cold-war had delivered much more success than Doman’s short and confused period of tactics based on bravado.

The Dutch-Khoi War of 1659 and Autshumao’s passing in 1663

In 1658 all civil relationships between the Dutch and Khoe had deteriorated and war broke out. The reason for the war was the confidence and practices that arose out of the treaty facilitated by Doman after the hostage drama and contrived cold-case trial. Doman buoyed initially by his popularity with the Goringhaiqua and Gorachoqua had shed the interpreter and diplomat charade to become an open advocate of resisting Dutch settlement. His role in facilitating the disastrous treaty which had given the Dutch the legal framework that Jan van Riebeeck had so desperately sought somehow was forgotten. Doman now became war adviser to the leaders of the Gorachoqua and the Goringhaiqua commander-in-chief.

The ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) though now by Jan van Riebeeck’s instruction were under the control of the Goringhaiqua, but they still went their own way and in fact were still seen by Jan van Riebeeck as the most daring and sharp in resistance. Under the leadership of Trosoa, who was second in command to Autshumao (incarcerated on Robben Island at this time) the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) played their own outstanding role as fighters during the war.

During the war Jan van Riebeeck put a bounty on the heads of all Autshumao’s  ‖Ammaqua (Watermans)  and set bounty-hunters after them.  The bounty was 20 Guilders if caught alive and 10 Guilders if dead for men, and 10 Guilders alive or 5 Guilders if dead for women and children. ^{[121]Schoemann K; Seven Khoi Lives – Cape Biographies of the seventeenth century; pg 65; Protea; Cape Town (2009).} The mobile fighters numbering 18 men moving with around fifty women and children were tracked down by a commando of ten European soldiers under command of a corporal, to the vicinity of Noordhoek and Fish Hoek. The ‖Ammaqua camp was attacked in a night time raid and Trosoa and two others were killed in the skirmish. One was reported to have fell over a precipice when shot and the lips of the other two were cut off as proof to claim the bounty. ^{[122]Schoemann K; Seven Khoi Lives – Cape Biographies of the seventeenth century; pg 69; Protea; Cape Town (2009).} The remnant ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) fled across the Cape Flats and northwest to the protection of the Cochoqua in Saldanha Bay, where 50 years later on his map Valentijn still records an ‖Ammaqua presence in 1717.

The war that Doman had launched was a series of raids and small attacks on Dutch infrastructure organised by himself and his ally Schacher (Osinghkhimma), son of Goringhaiqua Chief Gogosoa (known as the ‘Fat Captain’). Van Riebeeck, now realising his folly in having trusted Doman was forced to turn for assistance again to Autshumao imprisoned on Robben Island.

The Dutch returned Autshumao to the mainland to assist them to end the conflict but Autshumao’s time was past and his willingness to assist had also dried up. Seen as a waste of time, the Dutch took him back to Robben Island, but Autshumao was now encouraged by the resistance and had found new courage to not have to put up with this indignity and loss of freedom. Herri stole a boat on the Island and rowed back to the mainland – becoming the first political prisoner escapee from Robben Island. In his old age Autshumao lived up to his name once again as the man who moves across the waters like a fish. He fled to join the rest of his ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) under the protection of Oedesoa and his Cochoqua in the vicinity of Saladanha Bay.

Autshumao returned from Saldahna Bay and emerged at the disastrous negotiations for peace in 1660. Autshumao gained nothing for the Khoi in the peace terms which favoured the Dutch. He simply saw the last act of complete take-over and dispossession of what was the first port run by indigenous people in South Africa – for him his lifetime project. The Dutch did not send him back to Robben Island, proving indeed that the cold-case ‘court’ trial was a sham, simply to confiscate his cattle, destroy his power, his resistance role, and remove him from the community. Indeed during the rise in troubles between the Dutch and the Cochoqua Kai Bi’a Autshumao emerged again as a respected elder and Chief among Chiefs with whom the Dutch had to negotiate. His leadership role was something that they were never able to take from him.Autshumao died in 1663 having lived a remarkable and complex life in very difficult times of momentous change. Any critical historical appraisal should recognise him and his ‖Ammaqua – the people of the Camissa sweet-waters as the founding father of the port city of Cape Town. Throughout his life he had a strong sense of self assurance and dignity best expressed in an old Cape Town expression – “Ek is! Os is! Is Ja!”

Nommoa or Doman was seriously injured during what is referred to as the first Khoi-Dutch war which really left nobody as a winner of the war but did leave the Dutch as the victor over the peace. With Doman’s defeat, diminished status and death (also in 1663), the Dutch imposed an even more disadvantageous peace settlement that saw the Khoi lose their land in the first protracted ‘forced removal’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Africans in South Africa. The organised Khoi were banished off the Peninsular to behind the Tygerberg mountain and to the foothills of the Hottentots Holland mountains, so named because the Khoi were told that the Cape Peninsular was the VOC’s Holland and the mountains in the distance was the Hottentots Holland. Others succumbed to pacification.

Jan van Riebeeck established that the European notion of ‘right’ to the land by ‘conquest of the sword’ was the rule of law. This war and formal act of conquest was the completion of a take-over of Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua (Watermans) Port, and the seasonal grazing pastures of the Peninsular Khoi and as such it was the foundation of colonial South Africa.

There are still those descendants of the Europeans today who maintain that no land of the Africans was expropriated without compensation by the Europeans. In conclusion we can clearly see from the Journal in the hand of Commander Jan van Riebeeck the unambiguous statement that he made to the still bold and feisty Autshumao, now noted as one of the two elders and leaders of the Khoi on the Peninsular – that the Dutch have taken the land of the Africans by means of the sword.

^{[123]Van Riebeeck R; Van Riebeeck J; Precis of the archives of the Cape of Good Hope, Journal of Jan van Riebeeck Part 3; pp  118 – 120} “5^th and 6^th April 1660: This day peace was once more concluded with the captain and chief of the Kaapmen, Herri, and all the principal men and elders. Promises were made on both sides no longer to molest one another….though they firmly maintained their grievance that we had more and more taken of their lands for ourselves, which had been their property for centuries, and on which they had been accustomed to de-pasture their cattle, &c. They also asked whether they would be allowed to do the same thing if they came to Holland, and added that it would have mattered little if we had confined ourselves to the Fort, but that instead we were selecting the best lands for ourselves, without asking them whether they liked it or not, or whether they were inconvenienced or not. They therefore urged it very pressingly to be permitted once more to have free access to the same for the purpose mentioned.”

“At first we replied that there was not enough grass there for their and our cattle.”

“They answered ‘Have we then no cause to prevent you from obtaining cattle, as having many you cover our pastures with them? And if you say the land is not big enough for us both, who ought then in justice to retire, the real owner or the foreign usurper?’ “They therefore adhered to their old right of natural ownership, and desired to be allowed at least to collect bitter almonds which were growing wild in large quantities in that neighbourhood as well as to dig roots for their winter food.” “This likewise could not be permitted as they would find too many opportunities to injure the Colonists, and because we shall require the bitter almonds this year for ourselves in order to plant them for the projected fence. These reasons were certainly not communicated to them, but as they steadfastly adhered to their claims it was at last necessary to tell them that they had now lost the land on account of the war, and therefore could make sure of nothing else than that they had lost it completely, the more so as they could not be induced to restore the stolen cattle, which they had taken from us unjustly and without any reason, that accordingly their country, having been fairly won by the sword in a defensive war, had fallen to us and that we intended to keep it.

“They on the other hand complained very much that the colonists and others residing in the country had caused them great annoyance by now and then robbing them of a sheep, calf, &c., taking their uetids and armlets from their ears and arms and giving the same to their slaves, also by beating and thumping them, &c., without the Commander exactly being aware of all this (there is some truth in this), and not being able to bear this any longer had resolved to take revenge by stealing the cattle, so that they boldly maintained that they had sufficient reasons for what they had done.

“They were reminded, however, of the many instances when punishment was inflicted by us on those against whom they had brought their complaints for such and similar annoyances, &c., but that they had not been satisfied with this, but always desired to revenge themselves by robbing and stealing, and that (if this continued) no peace could be maintained between us, and that they would by the rights of war lose more of their country unless they had sufficient courage to drive us away, when according to the same rights they would become and remain owners of the Fort and everything as long as they could retain the same, and if they liked this, that we would have to see what we had to do.”

“They on the other hand complained very much that the colonists and others residing in the country had caused them great annoyance by now and then robbing them of a sheep, calf, &c., taking their uetids and armlets from their ears and arms and giving the same to their slaves, also by beating and thumping them, &c., without the Commander exactly being aware of all this (there is some truth in this), and not being able to bear this any longer had resolved to take revenge by stealing the cattle, so that they boldly maintained that they had sufficient reasons for what they had done. “They were reminded, however, of the many instances when punishment was inflicted by us on those against whom they had brought their complaints for such and similar annoyances, &c., but that they had not been satisfied with this, but always desired to revenge themselves by robbing and stealing, and that (if this continued) no peace could be maintained between us, and that they would by the rights of war lose more of their country unless they had sufficient courage to drive us away, when according to the same rights they would become and remain owners of the Fort and everything as long as they could retain the same, and if they liked this, that we would have to see what we had to do.”

But the spirit of Autshumao and the ‖Ammaqua had moved to Saldahna Bay and to the regrouping of resisters who joined the Namaqua, Oorlam Afrikaners, Springboks, Witboois, Damara, Griqua and Korana to continue fighting to live the free life of their forefathers, while others succumbed to pacification in the ever expanding Cape Colony.

EPILOGUE

I recently let my imagination run wild when there was a lot of fuss about the birth of the new royal baby born to British Prince Harry and his wife Meghan. The fuss being made about the fact that Meghan is a woman of colour and now that there is the first royal baby of colour just brought up a number of historical scenarios that did not make this event the “FIRST” that people think it to be.

I thought of our Autshumao known as Harry…. King Harry, as the English called him and, I thought of Harry Grey, Earl of Stamford and a long lie of indignities suffered by those labelled ‘Coloured’. Then I had a little chuckle when I heard that the parents of the new born royal baby were to call their child Archie. My wicked mind went into over-drive and I wrote a little piece for social media about how I thought Harry and Megan came up with the name Archie.

Meghan woke up in a cold sweat and wakened Prince Harry. “I had one rather disturbing dream Harry. There were two fellows both named Harry who impressed upon me that we must name our son Archie as some form of reparation for past unsavoury deeds of the kingdom. One was the much late Earl of Stamford, Sir Harry Grey, whose wife Martha Lady Grey had formerly been a slave, whose mother claimed to be Queen Rebecca a distant relative of one of your grand papas. Sir Harry says that his son John Grey and daughter Lady Mary Grey had been denied their peerage…. Well because they looked a bit like me…. Touch of the tar as your folks would say. Sir Harry said that the British Parliament actually passed a law just to deal with hiding the existence of John, his dear little Outjie (quaint little nickname), considered to be a Bastard. John and Mary were called primitive Hottentots by the media and British society who were deeply disturbed that their nobility could be as brown as their English roast.”

“All the while the other Harry was nodding away. You see he was actually one of those people they called Hottentots who did a fine job when appointed English Governor and Port Master first at Robben Island and then in Cape Town. But our English navy did not come to his protection and allowed the Dutch to walk all over him and steal his business. His real name, he told me, was Autshumao, but said that I can call him Autshi for short. He wants the restoration by elevation of his name to its rightful place.”

“So my darling Prince Harry, the two other Harry’s said that in honour of Outjie and Autshi we should pay reparations by calling our colourful little Prince – Autshi.”

“By gum” said Harry, “nobody could invent such a story; yes my dearest Meghan, our son will be named ARCHIE so that all in the kingdom shall know how we ran roughshod over those real decent Harrys out there…. One of them, the Archie of your dream – Autshumao, whom our good Englishmen called Herri.”

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